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Why do some venues evolve into litigation havens while
others do not? Venues might compete for litigation for various
reasons, like enhancing their judges’ prestige and increasing
revenues for the local bar. This competition is framed by the
party that chooses the venue. Whether plaintiffs or defendants primarily choose venue is crucial because, we argue, the
two scenarios are not symmetrical.
The Supreme Court’s recent decision in TC Heartland LLC
v. Kraft Foods LLC illustrates this dynamic. There, the Court
effectively shifted venue choice in many patent infringement
cases from plaintiffs to corporate defendants. We use TC
Heartland to empirically measure the impact of this shift using
an event study, which measures how the stock market reacted to the decision. We find that likely targets of “patent
trolls”—entities that own and assert patented inventions but
do not otherwise use them—saw their company valuations
increase the most due to TC Heartland. This effect is particularly pronounced for Delaware-incorporated firms. Our results
match litigation trends since TC Heartland, as new cases
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have dramatically shifted to the District of Delaware from the
Eastern District of Texas, previously the most popular venue
for infringement actions.
Why do investors believe Delaware will do better than
Texas in curbing patent-troll litigation? Unlike Texas, Delaware’s economy depends on attracting large businesses that
pay high incorporation fees; it is thus less likely to encourage
disruptive litigation and jeopardize its privileged position in
corporate law. More broadly, we explain why giving defendants more control over venue can counterbalance judges’ incentives to increase their influence by encouraging excessive
litigation. Drawing on Delaware’s approach to corporate litigation and bankruptcy proceedings, we argue that Delaware
will compete for patent litigation through an expert judiciary
and well-developed case law that balances both patentee and
defendant interests.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, a plaintiff is the “master of its complaint,” allowing it to file a lawsuit in the forum it prefers the
most. This choice is constrained by the constitutional and
statutory requirements of subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, as well as statutes that govern venue. But
in many instances, plaintiffs have a choice among multiple
possible forums in federal or state court.
While this ability to “forum shop” has been well studied,
some scholars have recently begun to home in on a parallel
phenomenon—the tendency of certain jurisdictions to “forum
sell” to encourage new case filings in their courts.1 A concern
is that forum selling might cause jurisdictions to bias substantive laws and procedural rules in favor of the party that brings
suit. And while most venues might have little incentive to forum sell, it only takes a few such venues to substantially impact the market for litigation.
We build on this growing literature by focusing on a key
fact—while plaintiffs file lawsuits, defendants often control
where those suits can be filed. For example, by deciding where
to file articles of incorporation, corporations can influence
where corporate litigation and bankruptcy filings occur.2 Most
public companies use forum-selection-bylaw provisions to restrict shareholder-litigation suits to the state of incorporation.
Likewise, corporations can and usually do file for bankruptcy
in their state of incorporation. Delaware, the most popular
state for firm incorporations, has become the jurisdiction of
choice for both types of actions.3
We argue that this distinction between plaintiff and defendant choice of venue is important yet underappreciated. Because of incentives grounded in political economy
considerations, forums that “sell” to defendants, primarily Delaware, do not produce litigation equal and opposite in result to
those that “sell” to plaintiffs.
1
See, e.g., Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 89 S. CAL. L. REV.
241, 243 (2016) (arguing that several jurisdictions now make the law more proplaintiff to attract certain plaintiffs to those courts); J. Jonas Anderson, Court
Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U. PA. L. REV. 631, 634 (2015) (“[F]orum shopping in patent law is driven, at least in part, by federal district courts competing
for litigants.”); Megan M. La Belle, The Local Rules of Patent Procedure, 47 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 63, 87–88 (2015) (arguing how local rules have created advantages to filing in
certain jurisdictions).
2
See infra Part II.
3
See infra Part II.
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We illustrate this dynamic in the context of patent-infringement litigation, an area of significant economic importance where forum selling has been both highly publicized and
roundly criticized. Until recently, patentees could sue alleged
infringers for patent infringement in virtually any federal district court in the country.4 The bar for establishing proper
venue was very low: the corporation simply had to be subject to
personal jurisdiction in that district.5 What emerged was a
system in which patentees flocked to one forum: the Eastern
District of Texas. This forum attracted plaintiffs by promulgating local rules and administrative procedures that favored patentees, such as by reducing the likelihood of granting summary
judgment and transfer motions, and by promoting faster discovery and pretrial deadlines.6
The rise of the Eastern District of Texas was largely driven
by litigation from patent-assertion entities, often referred to as
“patent trolls.” These entities own patents but do not practice
the underlying invention. Their sole purpose is to sue defendants (often large corporations) for patent infringement and to
extract payments for licensing agreements.7 Commentators
and members of both political parties have widely criticized this
system.
In May 2017, however, things arguably changed when the
Supreme Court decided TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC.8 There, the Court held that corporate defendants
in patent-infringement cases “reside” in a state for venue purposes only if they are incorporated in that state.9 In many
instances, TC Heartland will greatly limit plaintiffs’ choice over
venue and allow corporate defendants, through their decisions
where to incorporate and situate business facilities, to control
where they can be sued. Accordingly, TC Heartland will make
venue selection in patent-infringement cases more like that in
corporate litigation and bankruptcy filings.
TC Heartland provides a natural framework to analyze how
shifting control over venue from plaintiffs to defendants affects
future litigation. Post-TC Heartland, new patent filings have
already shifted dramatically away from the Eastern District of
4
See VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1576
(Fed. Cir. 1990).
5
Id.
6
See infra subpart I.B.
7
See, e.g., Christopher A. Cotropia, Jay P. Kesan & David L. Schwartz,
Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L. REV. 649, 651 (2014).
8
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
9
Id. at 1515.
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Texas to the District of Delaware, the state where most public
firms are incorporated.10 Yet it is unclear whether this shift to
a defendant-driven forum will have a material and long-term
impact on patent litigation. Some argue, with plausible reasons, that the decision will not curb patent-troll litigation but
merely move it to Delaware.
In this Article, we bring new empirical evidence to bear on
this topic. We conduct a stock market event study that measures how investors reacted to TC Heartland.11 In particular, if
the companies that were most affected by the decision saw
their valuations increase the most, then their investors likely
believe the decision will benefit them. More generally, our empirical analysis allows us to quantify how much venue matters
to these investors.
To conduct the event study, we first create a new database
that links patent-infringement lawsuits, filed between 2000
and 2015, to publicly-traded companies. We then compute the
probability that these public companies will be sued for patent
infringement using relevant predictors, such as research and
development expenses, cash holdings, and controls for the
firm’s industry. Incorporating a new dataset from Stanford
Law School, we also measure the probability that a patent troll
will sue a public company. We then evaluate the abnormal
returns for all public firms on the day that TC Heartland was
decided—that is, the change in stock-market value for these
firms in excess of what would have been expected absent the
decision.12
We obtain two main results.13 First, the most likely targets
of patent trolls (but not other patent lawsuits) saw modest increases in stock price. This suggests the market expects TC
Heartland to have a greater impact on troll litigation than on
lawsuits by non-trolls. Second, firms incorporated in Delaware
experienced a materially stronger stock price effect than other
firms. That is, there is a tangible “Delaware effect”— Delaware
firms that are most likely to be sued by trolls were most optimistic about TC Heartland’s impact. In contrast, the stock
prices of firms not implicated by the decision, such as firms

10
11
12
13

See
See
See
See

infra
infra
infra
infra

subpart I.D.
Part III.
Part III.
subpart III.C.
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incorporated overseas, though traded in the United States,
were not materially affected by the decision.14
Overall, the results indicate that investors are optimistic
that the flow of patent litigation from the Eastern District of
Texas to the District of Delaware will benefit corporate defendants. But is the investors’ optimism about Delaware warranted? And more importantly, why do they believe Delaware
will be different? To answer these questions, we explore the
political economy of Delaware and the litigation produced by
this defendant-driven venue.
Delaware actively competes for firm incorporations, and its
economy depends on incorporation fees. Delaware’s fees are
much higher than those of other states, reaching up to
$200,000 per year (as of January 2018) for larger firms.15 We
argue that Delaware has limited incentives to produce rules
that materially harm corporate defendants because high costs
from patent-troll litigation might dissuade firms from incorporating in Delaware. As many studies have documented, judges,
even federal ones, tend to internalize the incentives of their
home state, in part to increase their influence and to assist the
local economy and bar.16 This is what fueled the Eastern District of Texas to cater to plaintiffs’ interests. Because Delaware’s interests point in the opposite direction, we argue that
its courts are unlikely to follow in Texas’s footsteps.
Moreover, as is also well known, Delaware’s courts have
developed a reputation for expertise and predictable case law
because it is the most favored jurisdiction for both corporateshareholder litigation and bankruptcy filings. While some
complain that this phenomenon leads Delaware courts to bias
their jurisprudence in favor of corporate defendants and their
managers, the evidence for the most part presents a more benign picture. Delaware Chancery courts are well known for
their expertise in corporate law and the predictability of their
judgments.17 Likewise, the Delaware bankruptcy courts have
14
The TC Heartland Court explicitly stated that its ruling did not implicate
such firms. See 137 S. Ct. at 1520 n.2. Hence, the lack of market reaction for
these firms is consistent with how we would expect their investors to react.
15
See How to Calculate Franchise Taxes, DEL. DIVISION CORPS., https://
corp.delaware.gov/frtaxcalc.shtml [https://perma.cc/T8AJ-M6DC]. Before January 2018, the maximum fee was $180,000. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, The
Policy Foundations of Delaware Corporate Law, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1753–54
(2006).
16
See Klerman & Reilly supra note 1, at 272; Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey
P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L.
REV. 469, 496, 511 (1987).
17
See infra subpart II.A.

R
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developed a reputation for more efficient procedures and more
predictable outcomes than other bankruptcy courts.18 And
Delaware’s federal district court already has significant expertise in patent litigation19—recent appointments to the bench20
suggest that its expertise will only increase.
Given its leadership role in business law and strong connection to Delaware institutions, we believe the District of Delaware is unlikely to fritter away its state’s strong reputation in
this field to become a new patent-troll haven. As documented
in many studies, judges have strong incentives to attract and
keep high profile cases in order to enhance their reputation and
prestige, even when they have life tenure.21 Trying to emulate
the Eastern District of Texas would needlessly cause Delaware
to risk losing its stature.
To be sure, there is some risk that Delaware will become
too friendly to corporate defendants.22 This risk is arguably
stronger in patent litigation than in corporate litigation and
bankruptcy filings. In corporate litigation, if Delaware were to
unduly deter shareholder litigation, investors would be less
likely to invest in Delaware firms. In bankruptcy filings, workouts need to be approved by the creditors, and, in any case, the
debtor-in-possession (DIP) lender increasingly has more control over the process than the company itself. Analogous safeguards are not likely present in patent litigation.
Nonetheless, we believe this risk is limited for several reasons.23 First, judges have incentives to allow litigation of many
cases in order to develop expertise and increase their influence.
Second, Delaware has incentives not only to maximize incorporation fees but also to further the interests of its local attorneys. More patent cases in Delaware will likely benefit the local
patent bar and legal industry. Similar incentives have moti18

See infra subpart II.B.
Lauren H. Cohen, Umit G. Gurun & Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolling
Isn’t Dead—It’s Just Moving to Delaware, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 28, 2017), https:/
/hbr.org/2017/06/patent-trolling-isnt-dead-its-just-moving-to-delaware
[https://perma.cc/3LDJ-2ZDD] (noting that Delaware was the second most popular venue for patentees prior to TC Heartland).
20
Tom McParland, Trump Nominates Connolly, Noreika for Delaware District
Court, DEL. L. WKLY. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.law.com/delawarelawweekly/
sites/delawarelawweekly/2017/12/21/trump-nominates-connolly-noreika-fordelaware-district-court/ [https://perma.cc/WP9T-V37W].
21
See, e.g., Anderson, supra note 1, at 664 (citing several reasons for judges
to attract and keep high-profile cases: it can lead to favorable post-judicial opportunities, benefit the local communities, and increase the legal work within the
communities).
22
See infra subpart V.B.
23
Id.
19

R
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vated Delaware’s treatment of corporate litigation, which has
been rampant for many years, despite its effect on corporate
defendants. Most Delaware federal judges come from the Delaware bar and other Delaware state institutions, and they are
likely to be mindful of these institutions’ interests. Thus, they
are unlikely to disregard patentees’ interests to the extent that
patentees could boost the local legal community. Finally, because some patentees will likely have some choice among venues, the District of Delaware will still have competition for
patent litigation that should deter them from adopting an extreme pro-defendant bias.
We also consider the wider implications of TC Heartland.
First, we speculate whether the case will further enhance Delaware’s stature in the market for incorporation. Following TC
Heartland, firms that are likely to be sued by trolls may take
potential patent-infringement liability into account when making incorporation (or reincorporation) decisions. Our estimates
suggest that for a company with an average (median) likelihood
of facing a lawsuit by a patent troll, incorporation in Delaware
could be worth approximately $8.43 million ($411,684) per
year.24 This may be an additional incentive for firms to incorporate in Delaware.
Finally, we consider more broadly whether it is better to
give corporate defendants some control over choice of jurisdiction rather than ceding full control to plaintiffs.25 A comparison of Delaware corporate litigation and bankruptcy processes
(where choice effectively vests with defendants) and patentinfringement laws before TC Heartland (where choice vested
with plaintiffs) suggests that the former approach is more evenhanded and balanced. Regardless of which party chooses the
venue, judges have incentives to encourage litigation to enhance their prestige and to benefit the local bar. Giving plaintiffs full control over venue appears to exacerbate these
incentives because judges need only adopt plaintiff-friendly
rules to attract new cases.
In contrast, when defendants have more control over
venue, judges need to balance their own interests in encouraging litigation and defendants’ interests in curbing litigation. In
particular, because plaintiffs maintain some control over
venue, even in a defendant-driven system, courts have incentives not to forum sell too hard to defendants. What results is a
two-step venue selection process: first, defendants select po24
25

See infra subpart III.C.
See infra Part VI.
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tential venues; second, plaintiffs choose where to file suit from
among those venues. We believe this two-step process generates particularly strong incentives for judges to develop a reputation for quality and predictability.
Our Article proceeds as follows. Part I details the importance of venue in patent-infringement cases, focusing on the
rise of litigation in the Eastern District of Texas and the impact
of patent trolls, and discussing how TC Heartland and subsequent decisions have shifted litigation to Delaware. Part II provides background on Delaware as a center for business
litigation, focusing on how it has cultivated judicial expertise
and highly-developed case law in corporate-shareholder actions and bankruptcy filings.
Part III describes our data and empirical framework and
presents our results. Most importantly, we find the Delaware
corporations most likely to be sued by patent trolls saw their
corporate valuations increase the most due to TC Heartland.
In Part IV, we discuss the potential impact of TC Heartland
on the market of incorporation. We consider whether existing
firms and new companies may take into account how patenteefriendly a jurisdiction is when making incorporation or
reincorporation decisions, and we consider Delaware’s relative
advantages in this market.
In Part V, we explore why investors are optimistic that
Delaware will be different. In particular, we highlight why the
District of Delaware is unlikely to adopt pro-patentee or protroll rules similar to the Eastern District of Texas, given the
court’s previous actions in patent cases and, more importantly,
the state’s dependence on business incorporations. We also
explain why the Delaware court is unlikely to go too far in the
other direction and actively disfavor patentees in infringement
litigation.
In Part VI, we tie this discussion into a broader analysis of
plaintiff versus defendant choice over venue. As we show in the
patent context, giving defendants choice over venue can sometimes be effective at deterring excessive litigation, such as that
seen in the Eastern District of Texas.
I
THE BATTLE OVER PATENT VENUE
Venue is fiercely contested terrain in patent-infringement
litigation. This Part briefly describes the history of venue in
infringement cases, explaining how the rise of the Eastern District of Texas and the growth of patent trolls are intertwined
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and highlighting reasons for the district’s popularity. This Part
also details the growing backlash against venue shopping, culminating with TC Heartland and its aftermath.
A. The Rise of the Patent Troll and the Eastern District of
Texas
Federal district courts have exclusive subject-matter jurisdiction over all patent-infringement suits.26 Patent venue, governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), has two separate clauses that
specify alternate ways of determining which federal district(s)
are appropriate for suit. First, venue is proper if the defendant
“resides” in the judicial district in which the case is brought.
Second, venue is proper if the defendant has both “committed
acts of infringement” in the district and has a “regular and
established place of business” there.27
Since 1990, patentees have relied exclusively on the first
clause to support their choice of venue.28 This is because the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which decides all
patent appeals,29 held in VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas
26
28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under any Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .
No State court shall have jurisdiction over any claim for relief arising under any
Act of Congress relating to patents . . . .”). Patentees can also file suit before the
U.S. International Trade Commission to block imports of allegedly infringing
products. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (2018).
27
See 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b) (2018) (“Any civil action for patent infringement
may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or where the
defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established
place of business.”). Note that “venue” typically refers to the geographic region in
which a suit is brought, such as Massachusetts or East Texas, whereas “forum”
generally refers to a particular court, such as the District of Delaware, or the Third
Judicial Circuit for the State of Illinois. Because patent-infringement litigation
occurs exclusively in the federal system, forum and venue are synonymous in this
context and refer to the particular federal district court in which suit is brought.
28
Prior to 1990, the leading case on patent venue was Fourco Glass Co. v.
Transmirra Prods. Corp. 353 U.S. 222 (1957). The plaintiff there claimed the
court should rely on the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c), to determine
where a defendant corporation resided. Id. at 224–28. Under this approach,
venue was proper throughout the country for corporations that distribute their
products (i.e., “do business”) nationally. But the Supreme Court disagreed, noting that section 1400(b) trumped section 1391(c) because the “law is settled that
‘[h]owever inclusive may be the general language of a statute, it ‘will not be held to
apply to a matter specifically dealt with in another part of the same enactment.’”
Id. at 228 (quoting Ginsberg & Sons v. Popkin, 285 U.S. 204, 208 (1932)). And
when interpreting section 1400(b), the Court held that residence for a corporate
defendant meant its state of incorporation. Id. at 229.
29
Notably, the Federal Circuit was created in 1982 as a unified court for all
patent appeals largely to eliminate forum shopping among various circuit courts.
Because each circuit had different precedent, patentees in the 1970s would shop
among the circuits (often preferring the Fifth, Sixth and Seventh Circuits). The
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Appliance Co.30 that a corporate defendant “resides” in any
venue in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction when suit
is commenced.31 Hence, section 1400(b) did not impose any
additional constraints on plaintiffs beyond the constitutional32
and statutory33 requirements of personal jurisdiction. And a
manufacturer’s decision to target a venue by selling its product
there was sufficient to show that both personal jurisdiction and
venue were proper over the manufacturer.34
After VE Holding, patentees could sue corporate defendants with a national presence in almost any federal district
court. At first, the most popular districts were near major population or technology centers. For example, the five most popular districts from 1995 to 1999 were the Central District of
California (Los Angeles), the Northern District of California
(San Francisco and Silicon Valley), the Northern District of Illinois (Chicago), the Southern District of New York (Manhattan),
and the District of Massachusetts (Boston and Cambridge).35
Other districts became popular because they pushed cases to
trial faster. This included the Eastern District of Virginia
(ranked #8 from 1995 to 1999) and its famed “rocket docket.”36
creation of the Federal Circuit ended circuit shopping but not venue shopping.
See Anderson, supra note 1, at 646–49.
30
917 F.2d 1574 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
31
The VE Holding court justified departing from the rule announced in Fourco
Glass Co., 353 U.S. at 229, by claiming Congress changed patent venue law in
1988 when it amended section 1391(c) to read (in relevant part): “For purposes of
venue under this chapter, a defendant that is a corporation shall be deemed to
reside in any judicial district in which it is subject to personal jurisdiction at the
time the action is commenced.” VE Holding, 916 F.2d at 1578. The Court held the
amended language indicated that section 1400(b) incorporated the definition of
residence under section 1391(c): “We now have exact and classic language of
incorporation: ‘For purposes of venue under this chapter . . . .’ Congress could
readily have added ‘except for section 1400(b),’ if that exception, which we can
presume was well known to the Congress, was intended to be maintained. Certainly it would not be sensible to require Congress to say, ‘For purposes of this
chapter, and we mean everything in this chapter . . . ,’ in order to ensure that it has
covered everything in a chapter of the statutes.” Id. at 1579.
32
See, e.g., Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (for
personal jurisdiction to exist, a party must have “certain minimum contacts with
[the forum] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice.’”).
33
State long-arm statutes spell out the extent to which a state court may
exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant.
34
See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 112
(1987) (foreign company might be subject to personal jurisdiction if aware its
products might end up in a forum state via “stream of commerce”).
35
See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic
Choice Affect Innovation?, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 558, 571 tbl.1 (2001).
36
The Eastern District of Virginia still has the nation’s fastest trial docket.
See Robert M. Tata, Virginia’s ‘Rocket Docket’ Continues To Roar, LAW360 (Apr. 17,

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN102.txt

112

unknown

Seq: 12

25-JAN-19

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

8:54

[Vol. 104:101

But these early spikes were just precursors to the main
event: the rise of the Eastern District of Texas as the dominant
venue for patent-infringement litigation. Using our dataset, we
show the district’s spectacular growth in Figure 1, which
graphs patent suits filed in the Eastern District of Texas each
year from 2000 through 2015 as a percentage of all infringement cases.
FIGURE 1
PERCENT SUITS FILED IN E.D. TEXAS: 2000–2015
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*All data from Stanford NPE dataset as of 1/2/2018

Apart from a slight decline in 2008 and 2009, the share of
lawsuits filed in the Eastern District of Texas increased every
year starting in 2002. And the growth has been dramatic: only
1.2% of all patent-infringement suits were filed in the Eastern
District in 2002 while an incredible 43.6% of all infringement
suits were filed there in 2015.
How did the Eastern District of Texas become the predominant venue for patent-infringement litigation? Largely, it was
2015, 10:13 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/644064/virginia-s-rocketdocket-continues-to-roar [https://perma.cc/RD5A-4TPQ] (noting that it “had the
fastest trial docket in the country in 2014. Once again. For the seventh year in a
row.”). Other top 10 districts in terms of popularity included the District of Delaware (6), the Southern District of Florida (7), the District of New Jersey (9), and the
District of Minnesota (10). See Moore, supra note 35, at 571 tbl.1.

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN102.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 13

25-JAN-19

WILL DELAWARE BE DIFFERENT?

8:54

113

because the district became the forum of choice for patentassertion entities, more commonly referred to as patent trolls,
whose sole purpose is to bring patent-infringement suits and
obtain licensing payments for inventions they do not practice.
Figure 2 illustrates this dynamic. The solid line shows the
number of suits filed in the Eastern District of Texas by year;
the dashed line shows the proportion of patent infringement
suits in the Eastern District that were brought by trolls.37
While there was a significant amount of non-troll litigation in
the Eastern District (much of it between competitors), the
growth in litigation in the Eastern District of Texas was primarily driven by the increase in troll litigation over time, with a
sharp spike beginning around 2010.38
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FIGURE 2
RISE OF E.D. TEXAS AND PATENT TROLLS: 2000–2013
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37
Figure 2 is limited to lawsuits whose plaintiffs have been coded as part of
the Stanford Non-Practicing Entity Litigation Dataset as of early 2018. This encompasses about 82% of all patent lawsuits filed between 2000 and 2013. We see
a similar graph, however, if we use a random sample of all cases, as selected by
the Stanford coders. So, we expect Figure 2 is largely representative of the entire
universe of patent-infringement cases.
38
Part of this spike is attributable to changes in joinder rules under the
Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, signed into law on September 16, 2011. See
infra note 65 and accompanying text. To account for this change in joinder rules,
we also looked at how the number of publicly traded defendants across suits
(rather than the total number of lawsuits) changed over time in the Eastern
District of Texas. The results are like those in Figure 2, with most lawsuits in the
Eastern District of Texas being brought by patent trolls and with a significant
increase in defendants around 2010.
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So, the Eastern District’s rise is largely intertwined with a
story of how patent trolls became the dominant filers of patentinfringement suits.39
B. Analyzing the Eastern District of Texas’s Popularity
Why did the Eastern District of Texas become so popular
with patentees, and, in particular, with patent trolls? It is not
because of size—the entire district contains only 1% of the
United States’ population but hosted almost 45% of all patentinfringement suits in 2015. And that year, almost 1,700 new
patent cases (out of 5,819 filed nationwide) ended up in a single
federal district court in Marshall, Texas—which has fewer than
24,000 people.40
The Eastern District’s popularity largely stems from actions the court itself took to encourage infringement suits.41
For example, the Eastern District was one of the first districts
to adopt patent local rules.42 These kinds of rules, on their
own, are not necessarily patentee-friendly;43 however, the ones
39
Patent-assertion entities in the Eastern District of Texas primarily filed
lawsuits in the software, computing, and telecommunications industries. See
Brian J. Love & James Yoon, Predictably Expensive: A Critical Look at Patent
Litigation in the Eastern District of Texas, 20 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2017); see
also id. at 12–13 (“[C]ases litigated in the Eastern District of Texas overwhelmingly
involve patents covering inventions made elsewhere, asserted against parties located elsewhere, and by plaintiffs with little or no connection to the region prior to
filing a complaint.”).
40
Kayleigh Rogers, The Small Town Judge Who Sees a Quarter of the Nation’s
Patent Cases, VICE: MOTHERBOARD (May 5, 2016, 9:00 AM), https://
motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/aek3pp/the-small-town-judge-who-sees-aquarter-of-the-nations-patent-cases [https://perma.cc/8KPE-EACX].
41
That the Eastern District of Texas actively encourages patent litigation is
no secret. As Judith Guthrie, a former federal magistrate judge in Tyler, Texas,
said, “Anybody who applies to be a judge in the Eastern District knows what the
deal is . . . . It’s like an unspoken job description. It will continue until the bar
decides to file elsewhere or until Congress changes the law.” See Loren Steffy,
Patently Unfair, TEX. MONTHLY, (Oct. 2014), https://www.texasmonthly.com/politics/patently-unfair/ [https://perma.cc/AR9Z-EM6R].
42
In 2001, Judge T. John Ward, who sat in Marshall, Texas, imported and
modified procedural rules for his court based on patent local rules created in the
Northern District of California. The full Eastern District of Texas adopted these
rules in 2005. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 652; see also id. at 634 (noting that
differences among district courts pertain to local procedures since all patent
infringement cases are governed by the same legal rules and the same Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure); La Belle, supra note 1 (arguing against proliferation of
local patent rules, which promote non-uniformity across forums and increase
forum shopping); Mark A. Lemley, Where to File Your Patent Case, 38 AIPLA Q.J.
401, 403–04 (2010).
43
Patent local rules, for example, often require patentees to provide infringement contentions early in the litigation, which in turn requires the patentee to be
specific about the claims it is asserting and the allegedly infringing features in
defendants’ products or services. These rules might also speed things forward to
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adopted and applied in the Eastern District included patenteefriendly provisions such as compressing discovery timelines44
and reducing parties’ ability to delay discovery and trial
dates.45 Importantly, speeding up discovery and hastening
trial systematically favor patent-assertion entities—because
these firms own patents but do not practice the underlying
inventions, there is very little, if anything, they have to produce
during discovery. By contrast, corporate patent defendants
often spend tens or even hundreds of thousands of dollars in
legal and other fees to produce discovery on their allegedly
infringing products.
Other more informal administrative rules or case management procedures created by Eastern District of Texas judges
also favor patentees. For example, judges in the Eastern District disproportionately allow cases to go to trial rather resolving them on summary judgment,46 a practice that generally
disfavors patent defendants. This is also significant in part
because, due to the region’s history, the local population appears to be friendly to patentees. East Texas was previously a
hub for class action and mass-tort litigation, particularly actions against railroads. These cases, the argument goes, instilled a tradition of distrust in local jurors against corporate
defendants, which carries on today into the patent context.47
Relatedly, some commentators argue that Eastern District jurors view patents almost like real property—hence, a patentinfringement action is viewed akin to a trespass.48 This belief
claim construction, where a favorable ruling can help a defendant kill a case
relatively quickly.
44
For example, the Eastern District of Texas set discovery deadlines of nine
months instead of eighteen months, which was the timeline in the Northern
District of California. See Anderson, supra note 1, at 652.
45
See id. at 652; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 268–70.
46
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 251–54; Love & Yoon, supra note 39,
at 17 (noting that “judges in the Eastern District of Texas grant summary judgment in defendants’ favor at a rate of about half the national average”); see also
Nate Raymond, Taming Texas, AM. LAW., Mar. 2008, at 100, 104 (quoting retired
Eastern District of Texas Judge T. John Ward who noted that “[m]ost of the time
we feel like there are fact questions,” and that “I don’t strain to get a summary
judgment if I believe there’s a fact question”); see also id. (quoting Paul Janicke,
an IP professor at the University of Houston who stated that “[East Texas judges]
thought trial was the American way of doing things”).
47
See Yan Leychkis, Note, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction: An Empirical
Study of the Meteoric Rise of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum
for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 193, 213 (2007). Of course, many patents
are owned or developed by corporate entities, but the romanticized vision of an
individual, working in his or her garage to create the next big invention, still has
considerable popular appeal.
48
See id., at 213–14; see also Adam Mossoff, The Trespass Fallacy in Patent
Law, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1687, 1692–96 (2013) (noting that numerous courts and
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arguably exists because folks in the district were used to “fighting with oil companies over royalties for their mineral rights.”49
These features have led some commentators to argue that
potential jurors in the Eastern District of Texas are particularly
plaintiff-friendly. The empirical evidence on this point, however, is mixed—to the extent plaintiff-win rates reflect how
plaintiff-friendly its jurors are (a highly dubious proposition,
because win rates depend on the selection of cases that plaintiffs bring and the selection of cases that do not settle), the
Eastern District of Texas appears plaintiff-friendly but not excessively so, at least in more recent years.50 Nonetheless, what
matters is that patentees seem to believe the district and its
jurors are more favorable for them, hence motivating them to
file suit there.
Furthermore, the Eastern District of Texas is not easy for
defendants to escape, because Eastern District judges are less
likely to grant motions to transfer outside of their district.51
And these judges take longer to decide such motions, as well as
summary-judgment motions, than judges in other courts, extending the time patent defendants can expect to spend there
even if they win their case or are able to transfer it.52 The
commentators have analogized patent infringement to trespass and arguing that
this analogy is flawed).
49
See Raymond, supra note 46, at 103; see also Leychkis, supra note 47, at
213. Some also claim Eastern District jurors have special respect for the government, which favors patentees, because jurors view the government grant of a
patent as an imprimatur of its validity. See id. at 213–14.
50
Compare Andrei Iancu & Jay Chung, Real Reasons the Eastern District of
Texas Draws Patent Cases—Beyond Lore and Anecdote, 14 SMU SCI. & TECH. L.
REV. 299, 305 (2011) (finding a patentee win rate of 73% in the Eastern District of
Texas between 1991 to 2010, with some prominent districts the same or higher
(C.D. Cal. at 73%; E.D. Va. at 79%) and others lower (N.D. Cal. at 66%; D. Del. at
61%), and Lemley, supra note 42, at 419–22 (2010) (noting the Eastern District of
Texas is not among the top five most desirable districts in terms of patentee win
rate at trial for all cases between 2000 to 2010), with Leychis, supra note 47, at
210–11 (patentees won 90% of all jury trials in the Eastern District of Texas
between 1998 and 2006). See also Anderson, supra note 1, at 653 (noting “no
plaintiff had ever lost a patent trial in the Eastern District until 2005: twelve trials
had resulted in twelve verdicts of valid and infringed”); Raymond, supra note 46,
at 102 (noting that Eastern District defendants began to fare better in 2007,
winning seven out of nine cases tried to a verdict).
51
See, e.g., Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 260–63. On multiple occasions, the Federal Circuit has found that the Eastern District of Texas clearly
abused its discretion by denying motions to transfer venue. See Bijal Vakil, Venue
Challenges: Increasingly Common in Patent Infringement Cases Filed in the Eastern District of Texas, WHITE & CASE (Aug. 4, 2011), https://www.whitecase.com/
publications/article/venue-challenges-increasingly-common-patent-infringement-cases-filed-eastern [https://perma.cc/C77U-53UD].
52
See Love & Yoon, supra note 39, at 17 (noting the district is on average 100
days slower than the national average when it grants summary judgment); see id.
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accumulated effect of such procedures makes litigation in the
Eastern District of Texas predictably more expensive for patent
defendants—thereby incentivizing these defendants to settle
cases and boosting the district’s popularity among patent
trolls.53
Finally, plaintiffs generally like to know ahead of time
which judge will be assigned to their case. While the Eastern
District of Texas technically assigns cases randomly, a combination of its small size and general orders issued by the district’s chief judge allow plaintiffs to predict with high
probability which judge will be assigned to their case.54 This
ability to “judge shop”—to hand pick which judge will hear a
case—makes the Eastern District especially desirable for
patentees.55
But why would the Eastern District of Texas encourage
patent litigants to file suit there? Patent cases are complicated
and time-consuming; why would judges increase their workload while their salary (and the number of hours in their day)
remains fixed? There are many potential reasons;56 we focus
on two primary ones here.
First, the more plaintiffs choose the Eastern District and
the longer their lawsuits last, the more local resources litigants
require. The economic effect of patent cases in East Texas has
been well documented. Restaurants and catering,57 hotels, litiat 16 (“Cases transferred out of the Eastern District of Texas are over twice as old
as those transferred out of the Northern and Central Districts of California.”); see
also id. at 26 (“Eastern District of Texas [judges] are less likely than their counterparts in other parts of the country to stay lawsuits pending patent office challenges of the patent-in-suit [in parallel administrative proceedings]”); Klerman &
Reilly, supra note 1, at 263–65; Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P.
Kesan, Strategic Decision Making in Dual PTAB and District Court Proceedings, 31
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 45, 84 (2016) (noting “the relative reluctance of the Eastern
District of Texas to grant stays”).
53
See Love & Yoon, supra note 39.
54
See Anderson, supra note 21, at 671–72 (noting, as of April 2014, “one
could file a patent case in the Tyler division and enjoy a 95% chance of drawing
Judge [T. Ward] Davis” and how all cases filed in the Marshall Division were
assigned with certainty to Judge [Rodney] Gilstrap); Klerman & Reilly, supra note
1, at 254–57.
55
See Anderson, supra note 1, at 671–72; see also Jonas Anderson, Judge
Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas, 48 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 539, 544–50 (2016)
[hereinafter Judge Shopping] (discussing how the court’s unique case assignment
procedure allows patentees to shop among the court’s judges).
56
See generally Anderson, supra note 1, at 661–66 (discussing several reasons why a judge would be motivated to engage in the forum shopping game with
litigants); Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 270–77 (explaining why several
jurisdictions have engaged in forum selling).
57
See Melissa Repko, How Patent Suits Shaped a Small East Texas Town
Before Supreme Court’s Ruling, DALLAS NEWS (May 23, 2017), https://
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gation support, and commercial office space58 all benefit from
the legions of well-heeled patent attorneys who regularly visit
Marshall and other Eastern District towns. And although local
counsel is not required in the Eastern District of Texas (unlike
some other federal districts), companies often still rely on local
counsel, creating a boon for local attorneys. So if Eastern District judges want to be economic “rainmakers” for their local
community, it makes sense they would encourage litigation
there.59
Second, patent litigation put the Eastern District of Texas
on the national map, and it arguably made the district’s judges
the most important jurists in patent law outside of the Federal
Circuit and the Supreme Court. To the extent this kind of
prestige motivates judges—and prestige is thought to be an
especially important consideration for judges who deal with
specialized litigation, like patent or bankruptcy cases60—then
it also explains why the Eastern District of Texas fostered the
growth of patent litigation in its courts.61

www.dallasnews.com/business/technology/2017/05/24/east-texas-supremecourt-ruling-setback-towns-final-verdict-locals-say [https://perma.cc/54PKFW7L] (“A hotel bought a subscription to PACER—an electronic docket that
monitors federal court cases—to track upcoming trials and sell rooms to attorneys.”); Steffy, supra note 41 (profiling the upscale Blue Frog Grill and the out-oftown lawyers who order catering from it).
58
Repko, supra note 57 (“Out-of-town companies began renting empty offices, in the hopes of appearing to have East Texas ties.”).
59
Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 272–75; Anderson, supra note 211, at
664–65.; see generally Diego A. Zambrano, The States’ Interest in Federal Procedure, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1805 (2018) (discussing in-depth the states’ myriad interests in federal procedure).
60
See Anderson, supra note 1, at 662–64 (noting ancillary benefits for judges
becoming specialized experts that include receiving invitations to speak before
specialized bar groups and bar associations at national conferences, as well as
lucrative post-judicial careers in the private sector); Klerman & Reilly, supra note
1, at 271–72, 275–77. See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Court Capture, 59 B.C. L.
REV. 1543 (2018) (discussing how federal courts, like federal agencies, can be
“captured” and citing the Eastern District of Texas as an example).
61
Indeed, other federal district courts have tried, and continue to try, to
encourage patent litigants to file infringement suits in their districts. For example, the District of Massachusetts is considering changing its local rules to make
patent litigation more efficient and entice more patentees to file suits there. See
Matthew Bultman, Change to Local Rules May Bring More Patent Cases to Mass.,
LAW360 (Jan. 11, 2018, 8:07 PM), https://www.law360.com/publicpolicy/arti
cles/999288/change-to-local-rules-may-bring-more-patent-cases-to-mass[https://perma.cc/WDE2-9DSR] (noting that the new local rules were drafted
based on suggestions from local patent litigators).
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C. Growing Resistance and TC Heartland
As the Eastern District of Texas gained in prominence and
the social costs of patent trolls became more apparent, criticism of patent-venue rules mounted.62 Frustratingly, much of
the growth in troll activity occurred post-2011, after passage of
the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), which was the
most significant patent reform legislation in decades.63
While some of the AIA’s reforms specifically targeted patent
trolls and venue shopping,64 they were met with limited success. For example, the AIA tightened joinder rules in an attempt to curb the common troll practice of suing large numbers
of defendants in the same lawsuit to avoid upfront costs.65 But
this change did not stem the tide of troll litigation; if anything,
as Figure 2 suggests, troll litigation continued to increase after
2011. Trolls simply split up defendants into separate lawsuits
instead of reducing the total number of defendants they
sued.66 Presumably, the fixed costs of bringing separate suits
were simply not high enough for the change in joinder rules to
make a difference.
As troll litigation and venue shopping continued to increase, political actors grew increasingly concerned. In 2013,
62
See, e.g., Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1478
(2010) (proposing that venue be constrained to “the district of the principal place
of business of any of the defendants”).
63
Most notably, the AIA created the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB), a
new venue in which third parties could seek inter partes review of already-granted
patents in hopes of having them invalidated. The PTAB was created primarily to
address the perceived problem of weak patents—those patents that were improperly granted because they did not meet the statutory standard of patentability.
See, e.g., Neel U. Sukhatme, “Loser Pays” in Patent Examination, 54 HOUS. L. REV.
165, 206 (2016) (discussing the role of the PTAB). Many scholars believe patent
trolls disproportionately use weak patents. See, e.g., ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 29–31 (3d prtg. 2007) (highlighting that disputes over patents generally involve weak patents). Hence, reducing the number
of such patents should deter troll litigation.
64
See generally Jim Harlan, Chad Everingham, Douglas M. Kubehl, Lisa A.
Dolak & David O. Taylor, The America Invents Act: Target, the Eastern District of
Texas, 15 SMU SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 471, 474–75 (2012) (evaluating several of the
AIA reforms that targeted patent trolls and venue shopping).
65
See id. at 472–73; Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 257–59. Under the
AIA, patentees could sue multiple defendants in the same suit only if the claims
against them “[arose] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences relating to the making, using, importing into the United
States, offering for sale, or selling of the same accused product or process.” LeahySmith America Invents Act of 2011, 35 U.S.C. § 299 (2012) (emphasis added).
66
This is apparent in our data. For example, using the sample of cases that
the Stanford NPE project has coded thus far, the total number of publicly traded
defendants sued by patent trolls in the Eastern District of Texas from 2009 to
2013 by year were 483, 1,167, 1,088, 1,018, and 1,282, respectively.
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the Obama administration authorized the Federal Trade Commission to conduct a comprehensive study of patent assertion
entities, allowing it to use its subpoena powers to obtain detailed private data on these entities.67 In 2015 and 2016, various bills were introduced in the Republican-controlled Senate
and House to attempt to limit venue shopping.68 Hillary Clinton also explicitly endorsed patent-venue reform as part of her
failed 2016 presidential campaign.69 But, like many other
pieces of proposed legislation during this time period, no venue
reform bill ever passed.
In December 2016, however, venue reformers were heartened by the prospect of judicial intervention when the Supreme
Court granted certiorari in TC Heartland.70 Although it had
been on the books for over 26 years, petitioners attacked VE
Holding, claiming the Federal Circuit had improperly incorporated the broader general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),
within the terms of the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b).71 As such, petitioners argued the Federal Circuit
67
FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY 2 (2016) [hereinafter, “FTC STUDY”];
see also Matthew L. Spitzer, Trolls, Nuisance Suits, and the FTC (Nw. Univ.
Pritzker Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Series No. 17-14, 2017). The report was
authorized under section 6(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act. Among other
things, the report classified patent-assertion entities into two categories: “portfolio
PAEs,” which offer manufacturers licenses to large portfolios prior to suing, and
“litigation PAEs,” which sue first and seek licenses later.
68
Venue Equity and Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016 (“VENUE Act”),
S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016); PATENT Act, S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015); Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
69
See Brady Dale, Clinton Endorses Patent Venue Reform as Apple Takes
$25M Hit, OBSERVER, (July 12, 2016, 7:17 AM), http://observer.com/2016/07/
patent-venue-reform/ [https://perma.cc/U6MN-LR7R].
70
Petitioners’ certiorari petition was supported by a raft of amicus briefs,
many of which focused on how the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of section
1400(b) had led to rampant venue shopping and the rise of the Eastern District of
Texas. See, e.g., Brief of Amici Curiae 56 Professors of Law and Economics in
Support of Petition for Writ of Certiorari, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Group
Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341). Ironically, TC Heartland did not
involve the Eastern District of Texas—it involved a corporate defendant who was
incorporated in Indiana but sued in Delaware. Hence, in that case, limiting suit to
the defendant’s state of incorporation meant moving the case out of Delaware.
71
Specifically, a sole question was presented in the cert petition: “Whether 28
U.S.C. § 1400(b) is the sole and exclusive provision governing venue in patent
infringement actions and is not to be supplemented by 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c).”
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands
LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017) (No. 16-341); see supra notes 27–28 and accompanying text for discussion of these provisions. Petitioners argued that the Supreme
Court had already held sixty years earlier in Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra
Products Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957) that under section 1400(b), a corporate
defendant “resides” in its state of incorporation. The petitioners claimed Congress
had not amended the statutes in any meaningful way since then to abrogate
Fourco Glass, and hence, the Federal Circuit’s decision in VE Holding was im-
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had improperly interpreted venue more broadly than section
1400(b) allowed.
At first, the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari
was thought likely to herald the end of venue shopping in the
Eastern District of Texas,72 particularly since the Court has
repeatedly reversed the Federal Circuit in recent years.73 Still,
substantial uncertainty remained, especially after oral argument, as to whether the Supreme Court would actually overturn VE Holding given that the case had been governing law for
so long and Congress had not stepped in to change the law in
the interim.74
The uncertainty was finally resolved on May 22, 2017,
when the Court issued its unanimous decision in favor of petitioners.75 In particular, the Court held that intervening
proper. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 14, TC Heartland, 137 S. Ct. 1514
(2017) (No. 16-341).
72
See, e.g., Dennis Crouch, Goodbye E.D. Texas as a Major Patent Venue,
PATENTLY-O (Dec. 14, 2016), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2016/12/goodbyepatent-venue.html [https://perma.cc/66CM-EQFQ] (noting the case had “the potential to truly shake-up the current state of patent litigation” and “[a]n 8-0
reversal of the Federal Circuit is quite likely, although my headline is likely premature”); Brent Kendall, Supreme Court to Hear Patent Case That Could Limit
Venue Shopping, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 14, 2016, 5:35 PM), https://www.wsj.com/
articles/supreme-court-to-hear-patent-case-that-could-limit-venue-shopping1481749533 [https://perma.cc/24MN-7V87] (noting the justices would have an
opportunity to end the “dominance of the Eastern District of Texas”); Jeff John
Roberts, Supreme Court to Mess With Texas Over Patents, FORTUNE (Dec. 16,
2016), http://fortune.com/2016/12/16/supreme-court-patent-venue/ [https://
perma.cc/D7XQ-64Z9] (noting this was “a case that will likely put an end to a
special Texas cottage industry that has been a thorn in the side of big business”).
73
See, e.g., Peter Lee, The Supreme Assimilation of Patent Law, 114 MICH. L.
REV. 1413, 1415 (2016) (discussing how the Supreme Court in recent years has
sought to minimize exceptionalism in patent law and bring it in line with other
legal fields); David Forman, Why Does the U.S. Supreme Court Keep Reversing the
Federal Circuit?, OSHA LIANG LLP (Mar. 31, 2017), https://oshaliang.com/newslet
ter/why-does-the-u-s-supreme-court-keep-reversing-the-federal-circuit/ [https:/
/perma.cc/AH6V-LWGJ] (noting the Supreme Court has reversed the Federal
Circuit in twenty-two out of twenty-seven patent cases since 2005). But see Paul
R. Gugliuzza, How Much Has the Supreme Court Changed Patent Law?, 16 CHI.KENT J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 330, 330–31 (2017) (suggesting the effect of recent
Supreme Court cases on patent law is not as dramatic as some might suggest).
74
See, e.g., Daniel Fisher, Supreme Court Seems Unenthusiastic About Eliminating Patent-Troll Venue, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2017, 9:44 AM), https://www.forbes.
com/sites/danielfisher/2017/03/28/supreme-court-seems-unenthusiasticabout-eliminating-patent-troll-venue/#56bf63ec1022 [https://perma.cc/NR4YZL8G] (noting questions from Justices Sonia Sotomayor, Elena Kagan, and
Anthony Kennedy suggesting they did not want to upset the longstanding rule)
Tim Ryan, High Court Unlikely to Disturb Patent-Suit Hub, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV.
(Mar. 27, 2017), https://www.courthousenews.com/high-court-unlikely-disturbpatent-suit-hub/ [https://perma.cc/VU9E-8K4B] (noting the justices’ apparent
unwillingness to change over twenty-five years of practice).
75
TC Heartland LLC v. Kraft Foods Grp. Brands LLC, 137 S. Ct. 1514 (2017).
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changes to the general venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c),
had no impact on the specialized venue statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1400(b).76 Accordingly, the Supreme Court overturned VE
Holding and, following the Court’s earlier precedent, held that a
corporation resides only in its state of incorporation for purposes of the patent-venue statute.
D. Evolving Aftermath: The Flight to Delaware
TC Heartland was undoubtedly important, and many believed it would immediately weaken the Eastern District of
Texas’s dominant hold on patent-infringement litigation.77
And in fact, during the summer of 2017, there was significant
movement of new patent-infringement filings away from the
Eastern District of Texas and toward the District of Delaware.78
Still, many observers remained skeptical whether TC
Heartland would have a lasting and significant impact on
venue shopping and troll litigation.79 While the decision limited patentees’ choice of venue under the first clause of section
1400(b) (based on a corporate defendant’s residence), it did not
address the second clause. That provision, as discussed previously, allows a patentee to sue a corporate defendant in a fed76
Perhaps surprisingly, the Court’s opinion in TC Heartland does not mention venue shopping or the Eastern District of Texas and remains narrowly focused on the statutory interpretation question at hand.
77
See, e.g., Joe Mullin, Supreme Court Makes It Much Harder for Patent Trolls
to Sue in East Texas, ARS TECHNICA (May 22, 2017, 4:25 PM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/05/supreme-court-makes-it-much-harder-forpatent-trolls-to-sue-in-east-texas/ [https://perma.cc/C96X-KXWX] (noting the
decision would “surely reduce the workload and influence of the Eastern District
of Texas”).
78
See Brian Howard, Patent Litigation Trends in the Three Months after T.C.
Heartland, LEX MACHINA (Oct. 18, 2017), https://lexmachina.com/patent-litigation-trends-in-the-three-months-after-t-c-heartland/ [https://perma.cc/QX5RXTKX]. Interestingly, while Delaware’s share of patent litigation has increased,
total patent litigation decreased by about 10% from 2016 to 2017. See Lisa
Ouellette, What Happened in Patent Law in the Past Year?, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION
(Jan. 22, 2018, 2:56 PM), https://writtendescription.blogspot.com/2018/01/
what-happened-in-patent-law-in-past-year.html [https://perma.cc/W32S-RD72]
(noting that Lex Machina reported 4,057 patent case filings in 2017 (with over 750
in Delaware) versus 4,529 in 2016 (with less than 500 in Delaware)).
79
See, e.g., Josh Landau, TC Heartland’s Effects: A Bang Or A Whimper?,
PATENT PROGRESS (July 3, 2017), https://www.patentprogress.org/2017/07/03/
tc-heartland-effects-bang-or-whimper/ [https://perma.cc/X5DS-QPZP] (noting
the Eastern District still has more patent cases than reasonable, though less than
before); Tom McParland, So Much for ‘TC Heartland’ Effect. One Apple Store
Enough for Venue, Judge Says, LAW.COM (Aug. 14, 2017, 7:47 AM), https://
www.law.com/sites/almstaff/2017/08/10/judge-single-apple-store-makes-dela
ware-venue-proper-for-patent-litigation-against-tech-giant/ [https://perma.cc/
EN8L-CPA3] (discussing court’s interpretation of the second prong for patent
venue).
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eral jurisdiction “where the defendant has committed acts of
infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” Selling a patented good without permission is an act of
infringement. So, the key question is what constitutes “a regular and established place of business.”
The U.S. district judge with the most patent cases on his
docket—Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of
Texas80—quickly addressed this question after TC Heartland.
Rejecting a motion to transfer by Cray Inc., Judge Gilstrap
created a new four-factor test as to what constitutes “a regular
and established place of business” under the second prong of
section 1400(b).81 Cray then petitioned the Federal Circuit for
a writ of mandamus vacating Judge Gilstrap’s order.
The Federal Circuit granted the writ and held that a “regular and established place of business” must be: (a) an actual
physical presence in the district; (b) that is stable and established (i.e., not temporary); and (c) that is “the place of the
defendant,” not just the defendant’s employee (e.g., an employee’s home office).82 In re Cray clarified that businesses
without a physical location in the Eastern District of Texas
cannot be sued there. So, while retailers with stores in the
Eastern District might still be sued in that venue, it would be
more difficult to sue other companies there.83
Even more recently, district courts have rejected other arguments that tried to stretch what constitutes a “regular and
established place of business.”84 While this remains an unsettled area of law, the general tenor of these cases suggests the
80
In 2015, 5,819 new patent-infringement cases were filed in the United
States; over one quarter of them ended up in front of Judge Gilstrap. See Rogers,
supra note 40.
81
See Raytheon Co. v. Cray, Inc., 258 F. Supp. 3d 781, 793 (E.D. Tex. 2017)
(analyzing prior relevant precedent, In re Cordis Corp., 769 F.2d 733 (Fed. Cir.
1985) and rejecting motion to transfer).
82
In re Cray Inc., 871 F.3d 1355, 1364–67 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (concluding that
two employees who work remotely from home is not enough to establish a “regular
and established place of business”).
83
We explore this topic in our empirical analysis below. See infra Part III.
84
See, e.g., BMC Software, Inc. v. Cherwell Software, LLC, No. 1:17-cv01074, slip op. at 4 (E.D. Va. Dec. 21, 2017) (concluding that renting business
servers in district was insufficient to establish place of business); Niazi v. St. Jude
Med. S.C., Inc., No. 17-cv-183-jdp, 2017 WL 5159784, at *4 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 7,
2017) (concluding that the district was not a place of business when employees
were not required to live in the district, owned their own homes, and did not store
company inventory or conduct business thence); Regents of Univ. of Minn. v.
Gilead Scis., Inc., 299 F. Supp. 3d 1034, 1043–44 (D. Minn. 2017) (rejecting
plaintiffs’ argument that defendant’s storage locker in Minnesota constituted a
place of business). See generally Ryan Davis, What Is a ‘Place of Business’?
Here’s What We Know Now, LAW360 (Jan. 10, 2018, 6:09 PM), https://

R
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“place of business” approach will not be so liberally interpreted
as to gut TC Heartland. As such, these decisions increase the
significance of TC Heartland in limiting patentees’ choice of
venue.85
II
DELAWARE AS THE HUB OF BUSINESS LITIGATION
In the last few decades, Delaware has emerged as the main
hub for business litigation in the United States. Delaware’s
status emanates from two main factors. First, while firms may
choose to incorporate in any U.S. state, over 60% of all U.S.
public firms decide to incorporate in Delaware. These are primarily large firms with high institutional shareholding.86
Second, a firm’s state of incorporation does not determine
where it can be sued; rather, state of incorporation determines
which state’s corporate law applies to the firm. However, under
some legal regimes, corporate defendants may choose venue
from a menu of available options, which include the state of
incorporation. These legal regimes primarily include corporate
litigation and bankruptcy filings.87 Under these regimes, Delaware emerges as the most popular jurisdiction.
www.law360.com/articles/999306/what-is-a-place-of-business-here-s-what-weknow-now [https://perma.cc/2A9A-LTNN] (discussing these three cases).
85
TC Heartland also generated uncertainty for defendants whose cases were
pending in the Eastern District of Texas when TC Heartland was decided. Generally, a motion to dismiss for improper venue is waivable; if a defendant does not
make the motion in its first responsive pleading or in a separate motion prior to
that pleading, then the argument is waived. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(3); FED. R.
CIV. P. 12(h)(1). However, there is an exception that allows late venue transfer
motions when there has been a change in intervening law. And the Federal
Circuit recently confirmed in In re Micron that TC Heartland did change the law on
venue, freeing many defendants in already-pending cases to seek transfer out of
the Eastern District of Texas. In re Micron Tech., Inc., 875 F.3d 1091, 1099–102
(Fed. Cir. 2017).
86
Ofer Eldar & Lorenzo Magnolfi, Regulatory Competition and the Market for
Corporate Law 1–2 (Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 528, 2017),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2685969 [https://perma.cc/W9CP-G4C5].
87
Unlike other types of business litigation, the venue for most securities
litigation is plaintiff-selected. Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat.
74, 86–87 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a)); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, 48 Stat. 881, 902–03 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (2006)). Nonetheless, recent evidence suggests that pernicious forum
shopping is not a major concern in this arena. Specifically, the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act and the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act push
most securities class actions into federal courts and impose theoretically uniform
high pleading standards. Brian Cheffins, John Armour & Bernard Black, Delaware Corporate Litigation and the Fragmentation of the Plaintiffs’ Bar, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 427, 449–50 (2012). There is some variation in how courts
interpret these standards. See James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas & Lynn Bai, Do
Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping in Securities Class Ac-
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As patent litigation shifts to Delaware, it is crucial to understand how Delaware acquired its status as the choice location for business litigation, and why its judges have incentives
to attract such litigation. This is important, in part, because
we know local incentives can influence the policies of federal
courts—indeed, this is exactly what we saw for patent infringement cases in the Eastern District of Texas.88
We focus below on the two areas of business law where
Delaware undoubtedly leads over all competitors: corporate litigation, which occurs primarily in state courts, and bankruptcy
filings in federal court. Overall, the evidence suggests Delaware competes for litigation primarily through its expert judiciary, as well as its predictable and detailed case law. Moreover,
at least in the corporate and bankruptcy contexts, Delaware
has ample incentives to take claimants’ interests into account.
We argue, therefore, that the risk that Delaware will adopt
procedures that are too defendant-friendly is relatively modest.
A. Corporate Litigation
Delaware state courts are without a doubt the most important courts for shareholder lawsuits arising under corporate
law. Their role stems from Delaware’s status as the most popular state of incorporation. Under the internal affairs doctrine,
corporations are subject to the corporate law of the state of incorporation, irrespective of the location of their headquarters.
Delaware fiercely competes for firm incorporations in large
part to increase its income from incorporation fees. Unlike
tions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 421, 431–36 (2009)
(discussing the three different approaches to scienter under the PSLRA). Nonetheless, plaintiffs generally opt to sue defendants in their home jurisdictions. Id.
at 429 (finding that 85% percent of securities class actions are filed in the defendant’s home jurisdiction, and that the remaining 15% tend to be relatively lowvalue cases). Professors Cox, Randall, and Bai explain that this occurs for two
reasons. First, where many lawsuits are filed in different jurisdictions based on
the same facts, these actions are consolidated by the multi-district litigation
panel, generally in the defendant’s home venue. This obviates any advantage
plaintiffs might achieve by filing in a “friendlier” venue. Second, even where
lawsuits are not consolidated, defendants may move to change venue on forum
non conveniens grounds. These motions are often successful, and, even when
they are not, they may delay lawsuits that plaintiffs would rather push forward.
Id. at 440.
88
See supra subpart I.B. Analogizing between state and federal judges might
be especially relevant in Delaware because, unlike other states, Delaware state
judges are appointed rather than elected, like their federal brethren. Although
they do not have life tenure, they serve for twelve-year terms, substantially longer
than most state judges. DEL. CONST. art. IV, § 3; Exec. Order No. 4, 12 Del. Reg.
Regs. 1439 (May 1, 2009).
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other states, Delaware charges substantial fees for firm incorporation, which can reach up to $200,000 for large firms. This
is a major source of revenue for Delaware; over 20% of its state
budget comes from these fees.89
Delaware’s rise as the primary locus for corporate litigation
occurred largely in the 1980s. Although relatively rare in the
1970s, corporate litigation exploded in the 1980s as a result of
the prolific merger activity during that time.90 Defenses to hostile takeovers and leveraged buyouts gave rise to plausible
claims that managers had acted out of self-interest; judges and
practitioners complained that the filing of such lawsuits was
almost “automatic” following the announcement of a deal.91
Delaware state courts became the primary forum for these
cases. Since then, Delaware courts have continued to attract
the most shareholder lawsuits arising under corporate law,
generating canonical jurisprudence.92
Historically, Delaware had policies that were friendly to
plaintiffs and their attorneys. For example, unlike many other
state courts, Delaware did not require plaintiffs to post security
for costs in derivative actions.93 And when multiple lawsuits
based on the same facts were filed in the same jurisdiction,
Delaware routinely awarded the lucrative lead counsel position
to the first plaintiffs to file, incentivizing plaintiffs to file
quickly.94 Finally, Delaware courts were generous in awarding
fees to plaintiffs’ lawyers.95 Easy approval of fee petitions and
settlements was part of the “Delaware brand.”96
However, a firm’s incorporation in Delaware only means
that courts must apply Delaware law when adjudicating suits
against that firm, not that the litigation itself must take place
in Delaware. Since the mid-1990s, plaintiffs’ lawyers have increasingly filed corporate lawsuits against Delaware corpora-

89

See supra note 15.
Cheffins et al., supra note 87, at 450–51.
91
Id. at 451.
92
ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 41 (1993); E.
Norman Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV.
163, 164, 167 (2004).
93
Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 496, 511.
94
John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act,
87 IND. L.J. 1345, 1372–73 (2012); Cheffins et al., supra note 87, at 465.
95
Unlike other states, which awarded fees for hours worked, Delaware based
fee awards on relief obtained, which was largely thought to be a more generous
system. Macey & Miller, supra note 16, at 497.
96
Armour et al., supra note 94, at 1370–71.
90

R
R

R
R

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN102.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 27

WILL DELAWARE BE DIFFERENT?

25-JAN-19

8:54

127

tions in other state courts and in federal court.97 Because
virtually all firms incorporated in Delaware have their headquarters elsewhere, plaintiffs’ lawyers can easily establish personal jurisdiction over defendants in another state, and the
courts of general jurisdiction in that state have subject-matter
jurisdiction over those suits.98
Corporate defendants, however, have resisted this development and have sought to restrict litigation to Delaware. Since
2010, many corporations have adopted exclusive forum-selection bylaw provisions, which require shareholders to sue corporations and their managers in the state in which the firm is
incorporated, typically Delaware.99 Following the Delaware
court’s Boilermakers decision,100 which held such bylaw provisions to be valid, many public corporations have since adopted
them, especially when going public.101 The forum-selection bylaws thus allow corporate defendants to choose the venue for
corporate litigation, and the choice for most public corporations has been Delaware state court.
So why did plaintiffs’ lawyers prefer to sue corporate defendants outside of Delaware? Primarily, it seems, it is because
Delaware took steps to curb the intensity of excessive shareholder litigation, especially strike suits challenging mergers
and acquisitions. Prominent Delaware judges have explicitly
criticized the plaintiffs’ bar by expressing concerns that plaintiffs’ attorneys hastily file groundless lawsuits just to force corporate defendants to settle. These lawsuits often yield few

97
Id. at 1367; John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware
Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 605, 610 (2012) [hereinafter Losing
Its Cases?].
98
Armour et al., supra note 94, at 1351.
99
Joseph A. Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum
Selection Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 336 (2012).
100
Boilermakers Local 154 Ret. Fund v. Chevron Corp., 73 A.3d 934, 954 (Del.
Ch. 2013); see also City of Providence v. First Citizens Bancshares, Inc., 99 A.3d
229, 240 (Del. Ch. 2014) (permitting designation of another state’s court). In
2015, the Delaware legislature stepped in and added a provision to the state’s
corporate code—Section 115—to make clear that either the charter or the bylaws
of a Delaware corporation may include a forum-selection provision for “internal
corporate claims.” Such provisions often do not require shareholder approval.
Section 115 codified the 2013 decision permitting bylaw provisions to designate
Delaware courts as exclusive fora. But it overruled the 2014 decision permitting
the provision to designate another state’s court as an exclusive forum. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 115 (2018).
101
Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum Shareholder Litigation, 14 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 33 (2017). As of
2014, the number is 746, and it has likely increased since then.
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benefits for the shareholder–clients, though they generate substantial fees for the lawyers.102
In recent years, Delaware judges have also scrutinized fee
petitions more closely, showing readiness to cut plaintiff lawyers’ fees, even when observing “significant litigation efforts.”103 Most recently, in In re Trulia, the Chancery court
rejected disclosure-only settlements on the ground that the
disclosures were not helpful to the shareholders and were
likely only designed to generate fees for attorneys.104 Delaware
no longer automatically designates the first-to-file plaintiff as
lead counsel, but rather balances various factors, including the
quality of the pleadings, the energy and enthusiasm demonstrated by the attorneys, and the economic stake each plaintiff
has in the litigation.105 In contrast, other states have been
more willing to continue following the custom of allowing firstfilers to serve as lead counsel. And unlike the courts of other
states, Delaware does not permit discovery in derivative actions
prior to a motion to dismiss, and rarely grants expedited discovery requests.106
Delaware’s efforts at curbing strike suits are yielding results. The flood of lawsuits, primarily takeover litigation, has
substantially decreased, likely due in large part to the In Re
Trulia decision, which made it more difficult for plaintiffs to
extract rents from disclosure-only settlements.107 Overall,
these events demonstrate that Delaware seeks to ensure large
corporate defendants are not subject to excessive and potentially frivolous lawsuits. The Delaware judiciary is sensitive to
the concerns that excessive litigation, including that which occurs in other states, could diminish the value of Delaware incorporation and hence harm Delaware’s ability to charge large
incorporation fees.
Was Delaware too harsh toward plaintiffs and too friendly
toward corporate defendants? The evidence suggests it was
not. Delaware corporations are still subject to substantial litigation, and a large fraction of transactions continue to be liti102
Armour et al., supra note 87, at 1367–70. Notably, similar arguments have
been raised about patent trolls. See, e.g., FTC STUDY, supra note 67, at 9–11
(noting high rates of settlement within first twelve months of litigation).
103
Armour et al., supra note 87, at 1370–72.
104
In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884, 891–92 (Del. Ch. 2016).
105
TCW Tech. Ltd. P’ship, 2000 WL 1654504, at *4 (Del. Ch. Oct. 17, 2000).
106
Armour et al., supra note 87, at 1379.
107
Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, 3
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 or http://dx.doi.org/
10.2139/ssrn.2715890 [https://perma.cc/6KRF-TJFG].
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gated.108 Likewise, plaintiffs’ attorneys continue to earn
substantial fees in shareholder litigation, which in fact exceed
those in other state courts.109 The empirical evidence shows
firms that adopted exclusive forum provisions, mostly Delaware firms choosing Delaware venues, experienced a positive
change to stock price upon adoption,110 and there is no evidence that adoption is due to poor shareholder monitoring or
managerial entrenchment.111
Moreover, there are several reasons why Delaware still has
incentives not to unduly restrict plaintiffs in corporate litigation. First, Delaware judges take pride in the reputation of the
Delaware judiciary for excellence and expertise, and they have
strong non-economic incentives to maintain this prestige.112
Part of the product that Delaware sells is the expertise of its
judiciary and the predictability of its case law; an excessively
pro-defendant approach could be self-defeating because the
judges would have little opportunity to develop their expertise
or their case law. Rather, Delaware judges have incentives to
maintain the flow of cases that may generate important precedents and affect major transactions. The Delaware approach is
thus not to eliminate all litigation, but rather to discourage
lawsuits that are likely to be disruptive while maintaining ones
that are likely to be productive. Indeed, some Delaware judges
are vocal in their insistence that good cases be vigorously pursued, as shareholder lawsuits are a “cornerstone of sound corporate governance.”113
Second, Delaware judges are drawn from practicing Delaware attorneys, or lawyers who serve in public roles in Delaware state institutions. Accordingly, they are more likely to
believe in the efficacy of Delaware courts, and are likely to
adopt procedural rules that facilitate litigation in those
courts.114 In fact, as discussed previously, before the 1990s
and the wave of excessive litigation, Delaware actually had
108

Id. at 5–6.
See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The
Dynamics of State Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 469 (2015)
(finding that Delaware awards higher attorney fees but dismisses a greater proportion of cases than other states).
110
Jared I. Wilson, The Value of Venue in Corporate Litigation: Evidence from
Exclusive Forum Provisions, 5 (Oct. 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=2646312 [https://perma.cc/ZZJ5-W8KM].
111
Romano & Sanga, supra note 101, at 70–71.
112
William T. Allen, The Pride and the Hope of Delaware Corporate Law: Keynote Address by the Honorable William T. Allen, 25 DEL. J. CORP. L. 70, 73 (2000).
113
Armour et al., supra note 87, at 1367, 1369.
114
Macey & Miller, supra note 1, at 502.
109
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rules that were more plaintiff-friendly than those of most
states, despite its strong incentive to attract firm
incorporations.115
Finally, Delaware judges are unlikely to excessively restrict
plaintiffs because, if they limit shareholders lawsuits to a degree that managers can engage in activities that harm shareholders, the value of Delaware firms may decrease, and
investors may be less likely to invest in them.116 This in turn
will discourage firms from incorporating in Delaware. We emphasize that this consideration does not exist in other legal
processes where the claimants are not shareholders, such as
bankruptcy filings (and patent-infringement lawsuits). Nonetheless, at least for corporate suits, Delaware’s balanced process appears to take into account not only the interests of
corporate defendants, but also claimants–creditors.
B. Bankruptcy Filings
Over the past few decades, Delaware has also become the
leading bankruptcy forum. Since 1978, the Bankruptcy Code
has provided firms seeking to reorganize under Chapter 11 a
broad choice of potential forums. The Code permits a firm to
file its petition in any district where the company has its principal place of business, its principal assets, its domicile, or its
residence,117 which includes the state of incorporation.118
In the 1980s, most bankruptcy filings were made either in
the district where the debtor had its principal place of business
or in the Southern District of New York.119 The shift to Dela115

Id. at 510–13.
There is ample evidence that Delaware incorporation is associated with
higher firm value. See generally Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm
Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. no. 3, 525, 527–28 (2001) (finding that Delaware firms are
worth significantly more than similar firms incorporated elsewhere and are significantly more likely to receive takeover bids and be acquired); Roberta Romano,
Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG.,
no. 2, 225, 261 (1985) (finding statistically significant positive abnormal returns
when firms reincorporated in Delaware, primarily for merger and acquisition purposes); cf. Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect, 20 J. L. ECON.
& ORG., no. 1, 32, 33 (2004) (finding small Delaware firms were worth more than
small non-Delaware firms from 1991–1996, but not afterwards, and larger firms
exhibited no Delaware effect).
117
28 U.S.C. § 1408(1).
118
In re Ocean Properties of Delaware, Inc., 95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del.
1988) (holding that the state of incorporation is a corporation’s residence for
purposes of the Bankruptcy Code).
119
Marcus Cole, “Delaware is Not a State”: Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional
Competition in Bankruptcy?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1850 (2002); David A. Skeel,
Jr., Bankruptcy Judges And Bankruptcy Venue: Some Thoughts On Delaware, 1
DEL. L. REV. 1, 1 (1998).
116
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ware occurred in 1990 when one company, Continental Airlines, chose to file in Delaware. Following its successful
reorganization, there was a steady increase in Delaware bankruptcy filings, such that by 1996, Delaware had become the
venue of choice for 86% of reorganizations involving large publicly traded debtors.120 Despite legislative attempts to curtail
this dominance,121 Delaware has maintained its position as the
most popular venue for bankruptcy filings ever since.122
What made Delaware so attractive to corporate debtors?
Delaware appears to offer several advantages to bankruptcy
filers. Like Delaware state courts, the District of Delaware
bankruptcy court developed a reputation for expertise in complex bankruptcy matters123 and has a predictable body of case
law.124 It further acquired a reputation for highly efficient and
speedy bankruptcy processes, which reduce costs. In particular, Delaware became known for pre-packaged workouts, in
which the debtor and its major creditors negotiate the terms of
120
Cole, supra note 119, at 1850. A study of bankruptcy venue in the 1990s
showed that the Southern District of New York was consistently a distant second
to Delaware. Id. at 1850–51. Moreover, studies have concluded that proceedings
in the Southern District of New York are significantly slower than those in Delaware. See Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An
Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967, 988–89 (1999) (finding that the mean and median processing
times in Delaware were 510 and 463 days respectively, versus New York mean
and median processing times of 765 and 582 days).
121
Reform legislation introduced by the House in 1999 removed state of incorporation as a basis for citizenship in bankruptcy proceedings. However, Delaware
senators, including Joe Biden, hit back, defending firms’ ability to reorganize in
Delaware. See Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1381
(2000). Biden continued to defend Delaware’s dominance in bankruptcy in more
recent years. See Joseph Biden, Give Credit to Good Courts, LEGAL TIMES 67 (June
20, 2005).
122
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 121, at 1367. Note that forum shopping
in bankruptcy proceedings is driven by large firms, as smaller firms do not have
multiple options for venue. Indeed, the shift to Delaware was driven by very large
firms that collectively owned over 70% of the assets of public firms filing for
bankruptcy during that period. Id.
123
See Cole, supra note 119, at 1864 (noting that Delaware bankruptcy judges
are viewed as expert in part because they have handled many similar matters, and
that this expertise is valuable to counsel who can rely on Delaware judges to
understand and resolve cases accurately and quickly); see also Kenneth Ayotte &
David A. Skeel Jr., An Efficiency-Based Explanation for Current Corporate Reorganization Practice, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 425, 461 (2006) (finding that corporate
debtors from districts with less experienced bankruptcy courts were more statistically more likely to file for bankruptcy in Delaware, and concluding that the
determinant of venue choice was Delaware’s expertise).
124
Cole, supra note 119, at 1860 (“[T]he existence of precedent in complex
cases [lends] predictability to new filings there.”).
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the reorganization before filing for bankruptcy and submit a
proposed reorganization along with or shortly after the filing.125
The incentives of judges to develop expertise and speed,
however, do not follow immediately from Delaware’s incentives
to attract firm incorporations. Bankruptcy judges are federal,
and thus they are appointed by federal courts of appeals rather
than Delaware itself.126 However, judges care about their own
prestige and the satisfaction of being selected to do an important job well.127 In this respect, Delaware’s state court reputation appears to affect its bankruptcy judges, who take pride in
the reputation for responsiveness and predictability that
makes Delaware a choice venue for business litigation.128
Moreover, bankruptcy judges are often drawn from the Delaware bankruptcy bar, and the bar plays a role in the selection
and appointment process of bankruptcy judges, just as it does
with Delaware state-court nominations.129 The Delaware bar
clearly benefits from the flow of bankruptcy cases into Delaware. In addition, because jurisdiction in bankruptcy is bundled with firms’ decisions to incorporate in a given state,
Delaware lawyers and judges have an incentive to maintain
Delaware’s reputation as the leading venue for bankruptcy
matters.130
That Delaware bankruptcy judges have incentives to attract corporate debtors raises the concern they will unduly
favor debtors at the expense of creditors’ interests. If this argument has merit, then Delaware judges may be too lax with
managers, and more likely to approve reorganizations in which
managers keep their jobs.131 Moreover, attorneys for corporate
debtors and their managers are more likely to choose a venue
that will approve their large attorneys’ fees.132 In support of
this argument, one study shows that debtors benefiting from
125
Rasmussen & Thomas, supra note 121, at 1374–76. Prior to 1990, prepackaged bankruptcies were relatively rare. However, they became more popular
in the 1990s, jumping from roughly 1% of bankruptcies to 11%. Id. at 1375.
During that time, half of pre-packaged bankruptcies were filed in Delaware. Id.
Moreover, studies have found that in the 1990s, pre-packaged bankruptcies made
up nearly 40% of the large bankruptcy cases filed in Delaware. See Eisenberg &
LoPucki, supra note 120, at 992–93.
126
28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (courts of appeals to make appointments “after considering the recommendations of the Judicial Conference”).
127
Cole, supra note 119, at 1848.
128
Id. at 1892.
129
Skeel, supra note 119, at 31–33.
130
Cole, supra note 119, at 1893.
131
Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Delaware Bankruptcy: Failure in
the Ascendancy, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1387, 1414–15 (2006).
132
Id. at 1415.
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Delaware pre-packaged workouts are more likely to file again
for bankruptcy.133
However, it seems implausible that managers and their
lawyers can control Delaware’s bankruptcy process. Since the
mid-1990s, most large corporate debtors have depended on
extensive bank financing immediately before and during the
bankruptcy process. Debtor-in-possession (DIP) financers
seem to influence where to file for bankruptcy, and, more
broadly, the steps that debtors must undertake as part of a
reorganization. These DIP financiers are unlikely to let managers keep their jobs or acquiesce to attorneys’ fees if these measures provide no value for the company.134 Second, all
reorganizations, whether pre-packaged or not, must be approved by a vote of the debtor’s creditors. That Delaware reorganizations tend to be approved relatively quickly suggests that
creditors do not typically view them as disadvantageous.135
There is some empirical evidence that firms choosing to file
in Delaware are more likely to file for bankruptcy again, suggesting that Delaware approves ill-advised reorganizations at
the expense of creditors.136 But this result appears to be
largely driven by selection effects because firms that are likely
to underperform in the future are also likely to select a cheaper,
faster process. Companies that file for bankruptcy in Delaware
have more secured debt than those that file elsewhere, suggesting that lenders may be involved in the decision to file in
Delaware.137 In addition, firms that file for bankruptcy in Delaware tend to come from states where the bankruptcy courts
handle fewer bankruptcy cases, suggesting Delaware’s expertise is driving choice of venue.138 More convincingly, a recent
study shows that the deviation between prices of financial
claims at the beginning of the bankruptcy process and the final
bankruptcy payoff is smaller in Delaware bankruptcy than in
133
Lynn M. LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54
VAND. L. REV. 231, 270 (2001).
134
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 123, at 456–57.
135
Id. at 457–58.
136
See Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are Delaware and New
York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 1956 (2002);
LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 133, at 255. These papers also suggest that firms
reorganized in Delaware have higher operating losses than firms reorganized elsewhere; however, this evidence appears to be driven by write-downs of intangible
assets and amortization of post-reorganization goodwill, and different measures
that exclude noncash charges, such as EBITDA, do not support this conclusion.
Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 123, at 444–49.
137
Id. at 460–61.
138
Id. at 461.
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any other forum; this supports the view that Delaware provides
more predictable outcomes than other forums.139
III
MEASURING THE EFFECT OF TC HEARTLAND ON FIRM VALUE
As we discussed, Delaware has strong incentives to maintain its status in the market for incorporation. This suggests
that following TC Heartland, its courts are less likely to be
patentee-friendly, and more likely to cater to the interests of
corporate defendants than the Eastern District of Texas would.
The reason for this is simple: if incorporating in Delaware
greatly heightens firms’ patent liability, then they might choose
to incorporate elsewhere. Of course, such firms would forego
the advantages of Delaware corporate law, but if they face a
particularly high risk of costly litigation, some firms might consider that cost worthwhile.
We believe Delaware has incentives to be responsive to
these concerns, and therefore to conduct patent litigation differently from the Eastern District of Texas. This prediction is
corroborated by media reports that came out immediately after
TC Heartland, some of which characterized the decision as a
massive blow to patent-troll litigation.140 Accordingly, we
would expect the decision to benefit corporations who are likely
to be sued by trolls, with their firm value boosted on the day of
the Supreme Court decision.

139
Jared A. Ellias, What Drives Bankruptcy Forum Shopping? Evidence from
Market Data, 47 J. LEGAL. STUD. 119 (2018), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2795824
[https://perma.cc/RK4P-ECRZ] or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2795824
[https://perma.cc/LC33-932N]. Ellias also finds similar evidence with respect to
bankruptcy filings in the Southern District of New York, but the result is not
statistically significant in all specifications. Id.
140
See, e.g., Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Ruling Could Hinder ‘Patent Trolls’,
N.Y. TIMES, (May 22, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/22/business/
supreme-court-patent-lawsuit.html [https://perma.cc/SAW5-MHQM] (describing TC Heartland as “a unanimous decision that was a blow to so-called patent
trolls.”); Editorial: Supreme Court Ruling Puts Patent Trolls in Their Place, MERCURY
NEWS, (May 28, 2017, 6:00 AM) https://www.mercurynews.com/2017/05/28/
editorial-supreme-court-ruling-puts-patent-trolls-in-their-place [https://
perma.cc/4HXT-MEF6] (“[TC Heartland] should mean the end of patent trolls
shopping for plaintiff-friendly district courts across the nation that have a reputation for handing trolls a better chance of winning.”); Supreme Court Patent Victory,
WALL ST. J. (May 22, 2017, 7:11 PM) https://www.wsj.com/articles/supremecourt-patent-victory-1495494661 [https://perma.cc/B5MC-UXZN] (“Trolls who
forum shop for judges will now have a harder time.”).
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A. Empirical Strategy
To test this hypothesis, we conduct an event study that
examines how stocks responded to TC Heartland, particularly
for firms that face a high likelihood of being sued for patent
infringement. Event studies are often used to study the impact
of legal changes, particularly in corporate law and finance,141
and have also been used to measure the impact of patent-troll
litigation on firm value.142 The underlying assumption of event
studies is that markets are efficient, so when a case is decided,
stock prices automatically reflect the news.143 Accordingly, if
TC Heartland reduced the odds that certain firms would be
sued by patent trolls, or decreased the expected losses in those
suits, those firms’ stock prices should correspondingly
increase.144
The first step in an event study is to define the event of
interest and the date or dates when the market learned about
the event. In our primary specification, the event window is
Monday, May 22, 2017, the date when TC Heartland was decided. We define this event day as date 0. We believe a one-day
window is reasonable—that is, the market reacted to the decision the very day the case was decided—given the high degree
141
For detailed descriptions of the event study methodology, see generally
Sanjai Bhagat & Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part I: Technique
and Corporate Litigation, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 141 (2002); Sanjai Bhagat &
Roberta Romano, Event Studies and the Law: Part II: Empirical Studies of Corporate Law, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 380 (2002); A. Craig MacKinlay, Event Studies in
Economics and Finance, 35 J. ECON. LITERATURE 13 (1997).
142
Using an event study methodology around the dates that defendants were
sued by non-practicing entities, James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, and Mike Meurer
estimated that NPE litigation resulted in $500 billion in lost wealth to defendants,
primarily technology companies. See James Bessen, Jennifer Ford, & Michael J.
Meurer, The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls 2 (Bost. Univ. Sch. of Law,
Working Paper No. 11-45, 2011).
143
Cf. MacKinlay, supra note 141, at 13 (“The usefulness of [an event study]
comes from the fact that, given rationality in the marketplace, the effects of an
event will be reflected immediately in security prices.”).
144
The gains measured here are gains to the firms’ shareholders via increases
in its stock market price, and hence, increases to the firms’ market capitalization.
Depending on one’s view of markets, it is possible this gain does not reflect the
same gain obtained by the firm itself—that value might be higher or lower than
the amount received by the firms’ shareholders. Compare Glynn S. Lunney, Jr.,
On the Continuing Misuse of Event Studies: The Example of Bessen and Meurer, 16
J. INTELL. PROP. L. 35, 36–37 (2008) with JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER,
PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK
(2008). Still, to the extent the firms’ true gain is proportional to the gain to its
investors, our results remain the same—Delaware firms that were not present in
the Eastern District of Texas and that were more likely to be sued by patent trolls
saw larger increases in value than other firms. Moreover, we care primarily about
what investors thought about the TC Heartland decision; as such, changes in
firms’ stock market value are directly relevant to that question.
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of anticipation and broad news coverage surrounding the decision. Regardless, our results remain robust for longer time
windows.145
The next step is to estimate what the expected return for
each stock would have been during the event period if the event
had not occurred (i.e., if TC Heartland had not been decided).
The abnormal return that is attributable to the event (i.e., the
stock price effect of the event) is the actual return minus the
expected return. To compute the expected return on the event
window, we use the following regression model,
Rit = ait + biRmt + eit
where Rit is the return on stock i on date t; Rmt is the market
return on date t; and eit is an error term, common to all regression models. The model is estimated using observations from a
window of 180 trading days prior to the event date [-180,-1].
This first regression yields estimated parameters, a' and ,
which we can then use to calculate the expected return on the
event date. This equals a'i + iRmt, using the market return on
the event day. The abnormal return, ARit, for stock i is then
simply the actual stock return minus the expected stock
return:
ARit = Rit − a'i − iRmt
Typically, to estimate the impact of an event, we would
calculate the average abnormal return for the event for each
stock, and then average across all stocks affected by the event.
This approach, however, does not make sense here for two
reasons.
First, TC Heartland did not directly affect some companies.
These include firms traded on a U.S. stock exchange but incorporated outside the country.146 Moreover, some firms will still
likely be suable for patent infringement in the Eastern District
of Texas post-TC Heartland, either because they are incorporated in Texas, or because they are somehow physically present in the Eastern District (e.g., via their corporate
headquarters or a store). We refer to this category of firms as
145
We will also look at a longer event window, which starts on the day of the
judgment and ends on Friday, May 26, 2017 (i.e., date [0,+4]).
146
The TC Heartland Court noted that foreign incorporated firms were not
affected by the decision. See 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1520 n.2 (2017). We note, though,
that in principle TC Heartland could affect firms that are not incorporated in the
United States if the market predicts that they will reincorporate into a U.S. state.
Moreover, it is possible that future litigation or legislation could affect the status
of foreign incorporated firms as well.
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“Texas firms” for simplicity. We therefore divided public companies into an Affected group—non-Texas firms incorporated
in the United States—and an Unaffected group—all other firms
in our sample. Our hypothesis is that the stock price impact of
TC Heartland should be positive and significantly higher for the
Affected group than for the Unaffected group.
Second, firms within the Affected group might vary in how
sensitive they are to TC Heartland, because many companies in
this group might rarely be sued for patent infringement. For
companies that face a high (low) probability of being sued, the
abnormal return should be higher (lower). Accordingly, we estimate the probability of facing patent infringement litigation
using the following model:
Lit = gCit + mt + tj + eit
where Lit is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a firm is
subject to a patent-infringement lawsuit in year t and 0 otherwise; Xit are firm-year financial controls, such as cash levels
and expenditures on research and development; mt are yearfixed effects, and tj are industry-fixed effects.147 We estimate
this model using data on patent lawsuits from 2000 to 2015, as
described below. For the main specification, we use a logistic
regression model, but our results are robust to other models
too.148 Using the estimates from the regression, we compute
the predicted litigation probability of public firms as of the end
of 2016. We focus in particular on the probability that a firm
will be sued by a patent troll, the most common and arguably
most disruptive form of patent litigation.149
Our final step is to regress the abnormal return of each
firm on the probability of being sued by a patent troll. We
predict that the higher this probability, the higher the abnormal returns for the Affected firms. In other words, an Affected
firm that is very likely to be sued by a patent troll in 2016 will
have a larger positive abnormal return than an Affected firm
that is unlikely to be sued by a troll. We do not predict any
147
This model is largely the same as that used in Lauren Cohen, Umit Gurun,
& Scott Duke Kominers, Patent Trolls: Evidence from Targeted Firms 8–11 (Nat’l.
Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 20322, 2014).
148
All the results are largely the same when we use a probit model, also
commonly used for regressions involving binary dependent variables.
149
We emphasize that for our purposes, it is not essential for this regression
to establish that the variables that predict litigation have a causal impact on
litigation probability; rather, it is sufficient that the variables can predict the
likelihood of litigation, and in particular, distinguish between predictors of troll
litigation and non-troll litigation.
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effect on Unaffected firms, since the TC Heartland decision did
not impact where they could be sued.
Furthermore, because we are interested in the potential
effect of Delaware courts on patent litigation, we also split the
group of Affected firms into those incorporated in Delaware and
those incorporated elsewhere. We examine whether the abnormal returns of each group are related to the probability of litigation. If the market expects Delaware to provide greater
expertise and predictability for patent-infringement lawsuits,
then the abnormal returns of Affected Delaware firms will be
more sensitive to litigation probability than those of the Affected non-Delaware firms or the Unaffected firms.
We note that in regressing the abnormal returns on a predicted probability we run the risk that our estimates will be
biased. This is because predicted probability is, in econometric
terms, a “generated regressor,” meaning that it is not observed
in the data, but is estimated using other data (here, from the
logistic probability regression). Therefore, it is inevitably measured with some error, and the estimates on these probabilities
could be biased.150 To address this problem, we compute the
standard errors of the estimates using a two-step bootstrapping process, which ensures that our estimates are
consistent.151
B. Constructing the Dataset and Summary Statistics
We first construct a panel dataset to estimate the probability that a firm will be sued for patent infringement. Our sample
is the universe of public firms from 2000 to 2015 in Compustat, a leading financial and corporate database. We match
public firm names to data on patent-infringement litigation,
sourced from the patent-litigation dataset released in 2017 by
the Office of the Chief Economist at the USPTO.152 This
dataset in turn contains information obtained from Public Access to Court Electronic Records (PACER) on all patent-infringement suits filed in federal district courts from 1963 to
150
See Kevin M. Murphy & Robert H. Topel, Estimation and Inference in TwoStep Econometric Models, 3 J. BUS. & ECON. STAT. 370, 375 (1985); Adrian Pagan,
Econometric Issues in the Analysis of Regressions with Generated Regressors, 25
INT’L ECON. REV. 221, 233–35 (1984).
151
We follow largely the same procedure as in Quamrul Ashraf & Oded Galor,
The “Out of Africa” Hypothesis, Human Genetic Diversity, and Comparative Economic Development, 103 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 18–19 (2013).
152
The Patent Litigation Dataset is described in Alan C. Marco, Asrat Tesfayesus, & Andrew A. Toole, Patent Litigation Data from US District Court Electronic
Records (1963-2015), (USPTO Econ. Working Paper No. 2017-06, 2017), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2942295 [https://perma.cc/Z9YZ-V4YW].
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2015.153 The matching to Compustat is based on defendant
names using a mix of exact, fuzzy, and manual means.154 We
further categorized each lawsuit by type of plaintiff, using the
Stanford Non-Practicing Entity Litigation Dataset, which categorizes plaintiffs based on whether they are non-practicing entities (NPEs), and if so, whether the NPE is a practicing
assertion entity (PAE) as opposed to, for example, a university.155 We treat any lawsuit filed by a PAE as patent-troll
litigation.
The variables we use to predict litigation probability include standard accounting measures from the Compustat
database: total assets, market value, R&D expense, and cash
level. We use lagged variables for the previous year and apply
log transformations to these variables. We further include past
returns, which are the firm’s stock returns for the past twelve
months. In addition, we include a variable, CashShock, which
is equal to 1 if a firm’s change in cash in the prior fiscal year is
among the top 5% of cash changes in the firm’s industry in that
year. We calculate the book-to-market ratio, which is the ratio
of firm book-value of equity to market value of equity, as of the
end of the previous fiscal year.156 We also construct a variable
Patents, which includes the number of patents issued to the
firm in the past five years, using data from Kogan et al.157
153
Id. at 5. This dataset was supplemented by additional data provided by Lex
Machina on defendant names for a random subsample of cases.
154
Our resulting dataset appears to roughly match the raw numbers and time
trends in data used by Cohen et al., supra note 147, at 29, who combined patent
litigation data with proprietary data on patent trolls and publicly-traded firms
from RPX Corporation, as well as hand-coded data from Cotropia et al., supra
note 7.
155
See Shawn P. Miller et al., Introduction to the Stanford NPE Litigation
Dataset, 1–2 (Oct. 23, 2017) (Draft). The Stanford NPE dataset categorizes plaintiffs into one of thirteen categories. They are: (1) Acquired patents; (2) University
heritage or tie; (3) Failed startup; (4) Corporate heritage; (5) Individual-inventorstarted company; (6) University/Government/Non-profit; (7) Startup, pre-product; (8) Product company; (9) Individual; (10) Undetermined; (11) Industry consortium; (12) IP Subsidiary of product company; (13) Corporate-inventor-started
company. Category 8 includes practicing entities; categories 1, 4, and 5 collectively are considered patent-assertion entities. Id. at 6–7.
156
Book value of equity is the sum of stockholders equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax
(TXDB), and Investment Tax Credit (ITCB), minus Preferred Stock (PREF). Depending on data availability, we use redemption (item PSTKRV), liquidation (item
PSTKL), or par value (item PSTK) to represent the book value of preferred stock.
157
See generally Leonid Kogan et al., Technological Innovation, Resource Allocation, and Growth, 132 Q.J. ECON. 665 (2017). This database contains utility
patents issued by the USPTO between January 1, 1926 and November 2, 2010.
Utility patents are patents issued for the invention of new and useful processes,
machines, manufactures, or compositions of matter, or new and useful improvements thereof. Similar to Cohen et al., supra note 147, at Table A1, we use the
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Finally, we add dummy variables equal to 1 for missing data on
R&D and missing data on patents.
Table 1 describes the data. The final database includes
82,311 firm-year observations and 11,922 firms. The average
firm faces 0.20 patent infringement lawsuits per year, and 0.10
lawsuits per year by patent trolls.
TABLE 1: FIRM DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 2000–2015
Mean 25% perc. Median 75% perc. Std. Dev.
Patent Lawsuits
0.20
0.00
0.00
0.00
1.37
Lawsuits by Trolls
0.10
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.81
Cash Level
297.96
2.28
16.38
90.42
1,832.89
Cash Shock
0.06
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.23
R&D Expense
61.56
0.00
0.00
6.89
447.50
Total Assets
5,860.55
30.63 211.75
1,343.42 45,525.42
Market Value
3,739.42
34.14 219.93
1,241.13 17,478.86
Book/Market
2.08
0.21
0.48
0.87
109.30
Past Returns
0.36
–0.34
0.00
0.31
20.84
Patents
37.99
0.00
0.00
1.00
407.20
Missing R&D
0.43
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.49
Missing Patents
0.28
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.45
This table shows descriptive statistics for the sample used for estimating the
probability of patent-infringement lawsuits. The sample includes 11,922 public firms from 2000–2015 (82,311 firm-year observations). All variables are
defined in the Appendix.

We calculate daily returns using data on stock prices and dividends sourced from the Center for Research in Security Prices
(CRSP).158 We keep the data for only the firms that (1) trade on
a U.S. stock exchange (2) have at least 170 trading days in the
estimation period prior to the event date (3) whose stock traded
throughout the week of the event date and (4) that did not issue
new stocks or redeem their shares in the relevant period. For
the market return, we use the value-weighted return of all
CRSP firms incorporated in the United States and listed on the
NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ.
We also divide firms into several groups. The first is Affected firms, which are all firms incorporated in the United
States excluding (1) firms incorporated in Texas (2) firms whose
headquarters are located in the Eastern District of Texas and
(3) firms that have a store in the Eastern District of Texas based
final year of the database to proxy for the patent stock of companies between 2011
and 2015.
158
Returns are equal to today’s price plus any dividends, divided by yesterday’s price.
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on manual checks of firms’ websites.159 We compute the litigation probability using the estimates from the litigation
probability regressions and the variable values for the 2016
fiscal year.
The final sample includes 1,548 firms. Seventy-four percent of the firms in the sample are in the Affected group, 47%
are Affected firms incorporated in Delaware and 26% are Affected firms not incorporated in Delaware (see Table 2).
TABLE 2: TC HEARTLAND EVENT STUDY — DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Mean 25% perc.
Median 75% perc.
Std. Dev.
Affected
0.74
0.00
1.00
1.00
0.44
Affected DE
0.47
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.50
Affected No DE
0.26
0.00
0.00
1.00
0.44
Market Value
9,195.80
290.98 1,295.13
4,798.19 32,226.16
R&D Expense
148.19
0.00
0.00
22.11
941.86
Cash
671.07
20.41
77.06
300.00
3,640.37
Patents
73.60
0.00
0.00
1.00
757.52
This table shows descriptive statistics for firms in the event study of the impact of TC Heartland on firm value. The sample includes 1,548 public firms
from 2017. All variables are defined in the Appendix.

C. The Value of TC Heartland to Shareholders
The first-stage regressions show which factors predict the
probability of patent litigation. These regressions are in Table
3. In column 1 we examine the general probability of facing
patent-infringement litigation, and in column 2, we evaluate
the probability of facing litigation brought by patent trolls. The
signs and magnitudes for the coefficients in columns 1 and 2
are mostly similar.
As expected, the estimates for the coefficients on R&D expense and the number of patents are positive and statistically
significant in columns 1 and 2. This means that firms with
159
To identify whether firms have stores in the Eastern District of Texas, we
identify specific industries that are more likely to engage in retail, and firms that
have a retail business segment based on the Compustat historical segments
database. We manually check the websites of these companies to determine if
they have a store in the Eastern District of Texas. Undoubtedly, this laborintensive process will include some errors. However, to the extent these are
“classic measurement errors” that are uncorrelated with the probability that the
firm is likely to be sued for patent infringement and uncorrelated with the firm’s
stock market performance during the event study, then if anything, these measurement errors attenuate our result, which would be even stronger in the absence of such errors. See, e.g., JOHN BOUND, CHARLES BROWN, & NANCY MATHIOWETZ,
Measurement Error in Survey Data, in 5, HANDBOOK OF ECONOMETRICS, 3705–3843
(2001).
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more R&D expenses and more patents are more likely to be
sued. We also find, similar to a study by Cohen et al., that
plaintiffs tend to sue firms with high levels of cash, presumably
to increase their chances of monetary recovery.160
In column 3, we evaluate the probability of a lawsuit only
by a non-troll entity; the dependent variable is a dummy equal
to 1 if a firm is subject to a patent lawsuit that is not a troll
lawsuit (i.e., it was not filed by a PAE). Interestingly, the coefficients on cash and R&D expenditures are smaller than in columns 1 and 2, and they are only statistically significant at the
10% level. This suggests that the probability of lawsuits by
trolls may be materially different than the probability of lawsuits by non-trolls.
We use these estimates to generate predicted probabilities
for each firm for which we calculated abnormal returns. The
average and median lawsuit probabilities are 13.8% and 6.7%,
the average and median troll probabilities are 8.1% and 2.8%,
respectively, and for non-troll lawsuits the average and median
are 5.6% and 2.8% (see Table 4).
TABLE 3: PATENT INFRINGEMENT LAWSUIT PROBABILITY
DETERMINANTS
(1)
(2)
(3)
All Lawsuits
Troll Lawsuits
Non-Troll Lawsuits
Cash Level
0.0612***
(2.69) 0.114***
(3.74) 0.0430*
(1.66)
Cash Shock
0.0412
(0.83) 0.0812
(1.31) 0.0877
(1.63)
R&D Expense
0.0961***
(3.70) 0.137***
(3.99) 0.0494*
(1.76)
Total Assets
0.158***
(4.87) 0.224***
(5.02) 0.127***
(3.37)
Market Value
0.229***
(7.39) 0.161***
(3.85) 0.273***
(7.56)
Book/Market
–0.194***
(–2.66) –0.291***
(–3.01) –0.113
(–1.21)
Past Returns
0.000625*** (2.85) 0.000720*** (3.15) 0.000592*** (2.72)
Patents
0.137***
(7.16) 0.122***
(4.77) 0.132***
(6.47)
Missing R&D
–0.232***
(–2.62) –0.0169
(–0.14) –0.385***
(–3.85)
Missing Patents –0.433***
(–4.90) –0.459***
(–3.85) –0.379***
(–3.83)
2
Pseudo R
0.284
0.350
0.261
N (firm-year obs) 82,311
82,311
82,311
z statistics in parentheses
*
**
***
p < 0.10, p < 0.05, p < 0.01
Table 3 presents the results of the logit model. The dependent variable in column
(1) is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is sued for patent infringement in a
given year. The dependent variable in column (2) is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm
is sued for patent infringement in a given year and the plaintiff is a patent assertion
entity. The dependent variable in column (3) is a dummy equal to 1 if the firm is
sued for patent infringement and the plaintiff is not a patent assertion entity. All
variables are defined in the Appendix.

160

Cohen et al., supra note 147.
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Next, we calculate the average abnormal returns and the
one working-week cumulative abnormal returns for the total
sample.161 The average and median abnormal returns on the
day TC Heartland was decided are both -0.1%. The average and
median cumulative abnormal returns are -1.0% and -0.7% (see
Table 4).
TABLE 4: EVENT STUDY OF TC HEARTLAND — RESULTS AND
PREDICTED LAWSUIT PROBABILITIES
Mean 25% perc. Median 75% perc. Std. Dev.
Abnormal returns
–0.001 –0.009
–0.001 0.007
0.017
(May 22, 2017)
Cumulative
–0.010 –0.028
–0.007 0.012
0.040
Abnormal Returns
(May 22–26, 2017)
Lawsuit Probability
0.138 0.028
0.067 0.172
0.174
Non-Troll Probability
0.056 0.011
0.028 0.069
0.078
Troll Probability
0.081 0.010
0.028 0.090
0.133
This table shows the results of the stock-price event study around TC Heartland for a sample of 1,548 public firms from 2017. The first row reports the
abnormal returns on the day TC Heartland was decided—May 22, 2017. The
Cumulative Abnormal Returns reports the sum of abnormal returns for the
week in which TC Heartland was decided (May 22–26, 2017). The table also
shows the predicted lawsuit probability, non-troll litigation probability and
troll probability for firms in the sample, which are based on the estimates presented in Table 3 (with definitions in the Appendix).

The main results of our analysis are reported in Table 5.
Panel A of the table shows results for Affected firms, and Panel
B divides Affected firms into those incorporated in Delaware
and other firms not incorporated in Delaware. The coefficients
of interest are the interaction of the various litigation probabilities with the dummy variable for Affected firms.162 Both columns in both panels denote a different litigation proxy (LP). In
column 1, we use the probability of non-troll lawsuits, and in
column 2, we focus on the probability of lawsuits by patent
trolls.
Our first results in Panel A suggest that TC Heartland did
not disparately affect firms facing a high probability of non-troll
litigation. Thus, the coefficient on non-troll lawsuit probability
is small and statistically insignificant, including for firms affected by the decision (see column 1 of Panel A).
161
We trim 1% of the observations in order to exclude stocks that experienced
very high or low increase or drop in value, which is more likely to be the result of
firm-specific events rather than the court’s decision.
162
Note that the coefficient on Affected is just a control for any factors that
might have affected the value of Affected firms on the event day(s).
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When we examine column 2, we see that firms certain to be
sued by patent trolls (i.e., with probability 1) experienced no
meaningful increase in returns, whereas those affected by the
decision experienced an increase of 0.975%. This result suggests that TC Heartland was good news primarily for Affected
firms that face a high risk of troll litigation, rather than just any
patent-infringement lawsuit.
TABLE 5: THE IMPACT OF TC HEARTLAND ON FIRM VALUE AND
LITIGATION PROBABILITY — ONE DAY ABNORMAL RETURNS [0]
Panel A

Litigation
Proxy (LP)
Affected
Affected
×LP

Panel B
(1)
Non-Troll
Probability
0.00271
(0.008)
–0.00102
(0.001)
0.00127
(0.009)

(2)
Troll
Probability
0.00011
(0.004)
–0.00164
(0.001)
0.00975**
(0.005)

Litigation
Proxy (LP)
Affected DE
Affected
DE × LP
Affected
NODE
Affected
NODE × LP

Constant

–0.00040

–0.00026

(0.001)

(0.001)

Constant

(1)
Non-Troll
Probability
0.00271
(0.007)
–0.00129
(0.001)
0.00264
(0.010)
–0.00057
(0.001)
–0.00093
(0.010)
–0.00040

(2)
Troll
Probability
0.00011
(0.004)
–0.00202
(0.001)
0.01131**
(0.005)
–0.00093
(0.001)
0.00530
(0.006)
–0.00026

(0.001)

(0.001)

N = 1,548. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap standard errors, accounting for use of generated regressors, are reported in parentheses.
Table 5 reports OLS regression results, where the dependent variable is firm
abnormal returns on May 22, 2017, the day TC Heartland was decided. Litigation Proxy (LP) is Non-Troll Probability in column (1), and Troll Probability in
column (2). Affected × LP, Affected DE × LP, Affected NODE × LP are all interaction terms between Litigation Proxy and Affected, Affected DE or Affected
NODE, respectively. All variables not defined here are defined in the Appendix.

Panel B shows our key result: the coefficients of interest for
non-troll litigation are economically small and statistically insignificant (see column 1), but the coefficient on Affected DE ×
LP is positive and statistically significant when LP measures
the probability of facing troll litigation (see column 2). More
specifically, Affected Delaware firms certain to face patent troll
litigation experienced a 1.131% increase in stock price. This
means investors viewed TC Heartland as a favorable outcome
primarily for Affected firms that faced a high probability of
being sued by a troll and were incorporated in Delaware, rather
than firms incorporated elsewhere.
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In Table 6, we examine the cumulative abnormal returns
for the full week surrounding TC Heartland. Naturally, these
results are less informative because other confounding events
might have occurred during the week to affect firms’ returns.
Nonetheless, the results are largely similar to those in Table 5.
In Panel A, we observe a 2.143% increase in the stock price
associated with troll litigation, although the result is only statistically significant at the 10% level.
More importantly, however, the results are again larger for
Affected Delaware firms, as we can see in Panel B. Affected
Delaware firms certain to face troll litigation experience an additional stock price increase of 3.271%. The result is smaller
and not statistically significant for non-troll litigation.163 These
results again suggest that Delaware firms especially benefited
from the rule change in TC Heartland.
TABLE 6: THE IMPACT OF TC HEARTLAND ON FIRM VALUE AND
LITIGATION PROBABILITY — CUMULATAIVE ABNORMAL
RETURNS [0,+4]
Panel A

Panel B

(1)
Non-Troll
Probability
Litigation
0.02841
Proxy (LP) (0.020)
Affected
–0.00067
(0.003)
Affected
–0.00229
×LP
(0.024)

Constant

(2)
Troll
Probability
0.01763
(0.011)
–0.00176
(0.003)
0.02143*
(0.013)

(1)
Non-Troll
Probability
Litigation
0.02841
Proxy (LP)
(0.019)
Affected DE –0.00427
(0.003)
Affected
0.02083
DE × LP
(0.024)
Affected
0.00525*
NODE
(0.003)
Affected
–0.04722*
NODE × LP (0.026)
–0.01100*** –0.01124*** Constant
–0.01100***

(2)
Troll
Probability
0.01763
(0.011)
–0.00499
(0.003)
0.03271***
(0.013)
0.00413
(0.003)
–0.00832
(0.016)
–0.01124***

(0.002)

(0.003)

(0.002)

(0.003)

N = 1,548. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Bootstrap standard errors, accounting for the use of generated regressors, are reported in parentheses.
Table 6 reports OLS regression results, where the dependent variable is firm
cumulative abnormal returns from May 22, 2017, the day TC Heartland was
decided, to May 26, 2017. Litigation Proxy (LP) is Non-Troll Probability in column (1), and Troll Probability in column (2). Affected × LP, Affected DE × LP,
Affected NODE × LP are all interaction terms between Litigation Proxy and Affected, Affected DE or Affected NODE, respectively. All variables not defined
here are defined in the Appendix.

163
In column 1 of Panel B, we observe a large negative effect for Affected firms
not incorporated in Delaware that are likely to face a high probability of non-troll
litigation. There is no apparent good explanation for such a result, and in any
case, it is not statistically significant at the 5% level.
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Notably, TC Heartland likely had less impact on some Affected Delaware firms that still have a stable and established
physical presence in other, more patentee-friendly venues (not
including the Eastern District of Texas). We cannot disentangle
this effect in our regressions, since we do not know all the
venues in which these firms maintain such a presence. Hence,
the coefficients we report would likely be even higher if these
firms did not maintain a physical presence in these other patentee-friendly jurisdictions (or if they decided to close these
offices post-TC Heartland and the market did not anticipate
they would do this when the case was decided).164
IV
TC HEARTLAND’S IMPACT ON THE MARKET FOR
INCORPORATION
Prior to TC Heartland, where a firm decided to incorporate
had little impact on where it could be sued for patent infringement. Now, state of incorporation might matter more, particularly for non-retail or online companies who are likely to be
sued by patent trolls. As such, an unexpected consequence of
TC Heartland might be that future firm incorporation decisions
will be influenced not only by states’ differing corporate law
regimes, but also by how friendly a state’s federal district
courts are to troll litigation. Although this will not affect firms
that are unlikely to be sued for infringement, state of incorporation will now matter more for firms who face multiple troll
suits each year.
How might TC Heartland impact firm incorporation decisions? While it is still early to speculate, we believe two trends
might emerge. First, some states might adopt local rules and
procedures that are more favorable to patent defendants in
order to cater to local firms, or perhaps even to encourage nonlocal firms to incorporate there. Second, this new competition
will likely end in a familiar way: with Delaware maintaining or
164
In an additional robustness test, rather than splitting firms into Delaware
Affected firms and Affected firms incorporated elsewhere, we include firms incorporated or located in California within the Delaware group. The rationale is that,
similar to the District of Delaware, the federal courts of California, primarily the
Northern and Southern Districts, are believed to be less amenable to troll litigation than the Eastern District of Texas. Including the California firms in the
Delaware group does not change our results, which remain qualitatively the same.
This is partly because there are few California firms in the sample that are not
also incorporated in Delaware, and therefore this specification is not materially
different from those presented in Tables 5 and 6. Nonetheless, this result may
provide some support for the argument that California-based firms might also
benefit from the Supreme Court’s decision.
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even furthering its appeal as the dominant state of
incorporation.
Regarding the first prediction, TC Heartland effectively
shifted control over patent venue from plaintiffs to defendants,
thereby raising the stakes of a firm’s incorporation decision. In
doing so, the decision created a new policy lever for states to
encourage incorporations: shift one’s local rules in favor of patent defendants rather than patentees and patent trolls. To the
extent federal courts are influenced by local economic factors—
something that appeared to happen in the Eastern District of
Texas165—they are more likely to adopt local rules or administrative procedures that favor patent defendants, to make the
state they sit in a more attractive incorporation destination for
firms.
To understand the benefits of this strategy, it is useful to
briefly explain the dynamics within the market for incorporation, which is largely dominated by Delaware.166 Firms may
incorporate in any state irrespective where their headquarters
is located. More than 60% of public firms incorporated in the
United States are incorporated in Delaware. Nevada emerged
as a potential competitor to Delaware for firm incorporation,
165

See supra notes 56–59 and accompanying text.
There is a voluminous scholarly literature that explores whether a market
for incorporation generates efficient corporate laws that benefit shareholders or
laws that favor managers over shareholders. Compare, e.g., FRANK. H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW 38 (1991)
(“[M]aximizing profits for equity investors assists the other ‘constituencies’ [e.g.
managers] automatically.”); Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 86, at 34 (finding that
“Delaware faces competitive pressures to adopt corporate laws that are relatively
shareholder-friendly,”); Romano, supra note 116, at 272–73 (“[R]eincorporating is
associated, in some situations, with positive abnormal returns for the shareholders and, at worst, it is a zero net present value transaction.”); Ralph K. Winter, Jr.,
State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEG.
STUD. 251, 289 (1977) (concluding that competition between states for corporate
charters does not work to the disadvantage of shareholders because
“[c]orporations must attract capital from a vast range of competing opportunities
and the state which ‘rigs’ its code to benefit management will drive debt and
equity capital away,”), with, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms’
Decisions Where to Incorporate, 46 J. L. & ECON. 383, 421 (2003) (finding that
“amassing antitakeover statutes makes states more successful in the incorporation market—both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting out-of-state incorporations.”); Lucian A. Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law:
The Race to Protect Managers from Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1171
(1999) (“States have developed a substantial body of rules, including both antitakeover statutes and judicial decisions permitting the use of defensive tactics”
that are “quite likely to excessively protect managers.”); William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 688 (1974)
(suggesting that “the cases point to the conclusion that Delaware has a laissezfaire attitude toward the fiduciary role and responsibility of management to its
shareholders.”).

R
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but it only succeeded in attracting a segment of small firms,167
and most large public firms remain incorporated in Delaware.
Most other U.S. companies are incorporated in the state where
their headquarters are located. Thus, other than Delaware, and
to some extent, Nevada, states do not generally seek to attract
incorporation of firms located in other states (“out-of-state
incorporations”).168
The current market for incorporation reflects the incentives of different states. Delaware is a state with a relatively
small economy. Therefore, it seeks to attract incorporations,
primarily of large firms who pay large annual fees, which can
reach as high as $200,000 per year.169 Other states mainly
cater to local interests, including the interests of corporations
located and incorporated in those states, but aside from Nevada, they do not appear to compete aggressively for incorporation of firms located in other jurisdictions.170
Will TC Heartland induce states to compete with Delaware
for firm incorporations? A state like Nevada, which has actively
competed with Delaware in the market for incorporation, might
adopt pro-defendant local rules or policies to encourage firms
to incorporate there.171 Other states are unlikely to compete
with Delaware for out-of-state incorporations, but their federal
167
In 2013, almost 30% of small public companies with less than $100 million
in assets were incorporated in Nevada. See Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note 86, at 43
(Figure 3).
168
Delaware has 80% of the market of out-of-state incorporation. See id. at 42
(Figure 1). “Other than Delaware, no state is engaged in significant efforts to
attract incorporations of public companies,” and Nevada “is the only state other
than Delaware that openly endeavors to attract incorporations . . . .” Marcel
Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of State Competition in Corporate Law, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 679, 684, 716 (2002).
169
Scott Goss, Projection: $64 Million More in Revenue for Delaware Next Year,
DELAWARE ONLINE (Sept. 18, 2017, 5:32 PM), https://www.delawareonline.com/
story/news/politics/2017/09/18/early-projections-show-improving-delawarebudget-picture/676592001/ [https://perma.cc/6QX8-42PG]. Many large firms
calculate their Delaware franchise taxes using the Assumed Par Value method,
which roughly calculates assumed par value capital by dividing total gross assets
over issued shares. Firms must pay $400 in franchise tax for every $1 million in
assumed par capital. Firms may also use the Authorized Shares Method, which
charges $85 for every 10,000 shares above 10,000. See Del. Div. of Corps., How to
Calculate Franchise Taxes, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware.gov/frtaxcalc.shtml [https://perma.cc/T8AJ-M6DC].
170
Kahan & Kamar, supra note 168, at 684, 716.
171
This is in fact quite likely since Nevada’s main strategy in competing for
firm incorporations has been to provide corporate laws that reduce the likelihood
of lawsuits. See generally Michal Barzuza, Market Segmentation: The Rise of
Nevada as a Liability-Free Jurisdiction, 98 VA. L. REV. 935 (2012); Ofer Eldar, Can
Lax Corporate Law Increase Shareholder Value? Evidence from Nevada (working
paper, on file with the author); Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, Nevada
and the Market for Corporate Law, 35 SEATTLE U.L. REV. 1165 (2012).
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courts may adopt a similar strategy of being relatively prodefendant. Consider California, where many high-tech companies and likely targets of patent trolls are located. Its federal
courts, primarily the Northern and Southern districts, have
already been less patentee-friendly than the Eastern District of
Texas,172 presumably because of the state’s well-known association with the high-tech industry. Thus, post-TC Heartland,
some firms may prefer to incorporate in their home state, if
their local federal district courts have adopted a favorable
stance on patent-troll litigation.
What about Delaware? In particular, if Delaware adopted
very patentee-friendly policies, might that induce some firms to
leave the state? Certainly this is possible—companies like Amazon and Facebook, which are located in California and incorporated in Delaware, face dozens of patent-infringement
lawsuits every year. If Delaware became friendly to trolls, the
opportunity to incorporate in another state, presumably California, where the rules might be more favorable to defendants,
could be attractive. To be sure, most firms may nonetheless
remain in Delaware. After all, the main benefit of incorporation
in Delaware is its corporate law and its expert judiciary.173 But
for some firms the expected costs of patent-troll litigation can
be very high, and for these firms the opportunity to ensure a
friendly venue for litigation could be more valuable.
This very possibility, however, leads us to believe that Delaware is unlikely to adopt rules or procedures that unduly
benefit patent trolls.174 Instead, Delaware’s dependence on incorporation fees175 suggests it will take steps to maintain its
status as the most popular state of incorporation, and prevent
a scenario in which likely targets of trolls are tempted to flee
the state. Put differently, Delaware’s current dominance in
172
J. Jason Williams, Mark V. Campagna & Olivia E. Marbutt, Strategies for
Combating Patent Trolls, 17 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 367, 369 n.5 (2010).
173
In addition, firms may prefer to remain incorporated in Delaware because
of the network externalities associated with being incorporated in the state where
most other firms are incorporated. See Kahan & Kamar, supra note 170, at
742–43; Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L. REV. 757, 843–47 (1995). In addition, firms may be sluggish in
reincorporating into other states because of inertia; Eldar & Magnolfi, supra note
86, at 3. However, despite network externalities and inertia, Eldar & Magnolfi
show empirically that firms do respond to legal changes over time, and suggest in
counterfactual analysis that if Delaware adopted laws that were adverse to the
interests of institutional shareholding it could lose over 10% of its market share.
Id. at 34–35.
174
See infra subpart V.A.
175
And as we show below, Delaware’s current rules are not particularly
friendly to patent trolls. See id.
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corporate law is corporate defendants’ strongest assurance
that Delaware courts will not veer sharply in favor of new troll
litigation.
More likely, Delaware district court judges will build on
Delaware’s reputation for judicial excellence in corporate and
bankruptcy cases, and its growing reputation in patent law.
The Eastern District of Texas staked its identity as a leader in
patent law; Delaware courts view themselves the same way in
the corporate and bankruptcy realms.176 It seems unlikely
that Delaware judges would want to risk Delaware’s reputation
in business law simply to encourage more patentees to file suit
in their jurisdiction.
If anything, TC Heartland might make Delaware a more
attractive state for incorporations, luring some new and existing firms away from their home states. Our event study
suggests the new benefits of Delaware incorporation post-TC
Heartland are not merely speculative. As we showed above, the
companies whose valuations increased the most post-TC
Heartland were Delaware companies that were likely to be sued
by patent trolls.177 This effect may stem not only from Delaware’s policies toward patent trolls, but from the belief that
Delaware will further bolster its expertise in patent litigation,
and that these efforts will result in more predictable outcomes,
as they have in corporate and bankruptcy cases.
More concretely, we can use our event-study results to
perform rough calculations that show why some non-Delaware
firms—particularly those likely to be sued by patent trolls—
might consider reincorporating in Delaware. To illustrate, our
one-day abnormal returns (see Table 5) estimate the return to
Delaware incorporation at 1.131%. For a firm with an average
market value ($9.2 billion) and facing an average annual
probability of troll litigation (8.1%), Delaware incorporation
would be worth $8.43 million per year. The numbers are much
176
Delaware’s pride in its role as a leader in corporate law is evident even from
a casual visit to the Delaware Court of Chancery’s website. See DELAWARE COURT
OF CHANCERY, https://courts.delaware.gov/chancery/ [https://perma.cc/PJ7DQHMH] (“The Delaware Court of Chancery is widely recognized as the nation’s
preeminent forum for the determination of disputes involving the internal affairs
of the thousands upon thousands of Delaware corporations and other business
entities through which a vast amount of the world’s commercial affairs is conducted. Its unique competence in and exposure to issues of business law are
unmatched.”). As discussed, it is likely that the District of Delaware shares at
least some of this sentiment.
177
Specifically, these are Delaware companies that are likely to be sued by
patent trolls and do not have a Texas presence. See supra notes 156–59 and
accompanying text.
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smaller if we look instead at the median firm ($1.3 billion in
market value and 2.8% probability of being sued by a troll in a
given year), but the net savings are still large ($411,684 per
year). And regardless, these values exceed the maximum annual Delaware incorporation fee of $200,000.
Which kinds of firms might take a fresh look at Delaware
after TC Heartland? At first glance, one might think large, nonDelaware technology firms such as California-based Apple and
Cisco, and Washington-based Microsoft, all of which have minimal physical presence in the Eastern District of Texas, would
consider reincorporating in Delaware.178 Patent trolls have
sued these companies many times in recent years, and it is
highly likely trolls will target them in the future.
Still, there are good reasons to be skeptical whether the
benefits of being a Delaware corporation would be large enough
to induce such firms to reincorporate there. For one, many
non-Delaware technology firms are incorporated in California,
a state that is perceived to be friendly to patent defendants.
Hence, the benefit of moving to Delaware would likely be minimal or non-existent for these firms. Moreover, to the extent
firms maintain physical operations in more-patentee friendly
states than Delaware, they would still be subject to suit in
those venues, and Delaware incorporation would provide minimal value. Finally, these firms had some reasons to incorporate elsewhere in the first place; these reasons might still
outweigh whatever financial benefits the firm would gain by
moving to Delaware post-TC Heartland.
Perhaps more realistically (though still unlikely), TC Heartland might induce some non-U.S. companies that face large
numbers of patent suits, such as Sony and Canon, to
reincorporate or create new subsidiaries that are incorporated
in Delaware. At present, even after TC Heartland, these foreign
companies can be sued for patent infringement in any venue,
including the Eastern District of Texas.179 Again, the benefits
178
Apple and Cisco are incorporated in California. Apple Inc., Annual Report
(Form 10-K) (Nov. 3, 2017); Cisco Systems, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Sept.
7, 2017). Microsoft is incorporated in Washington. Microsoft Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K) (Aug. 2, 2017). Apple has two stores in the Eastern District of
Texas (in Plano and Frisco, both northern Dallas suburbs); Microsoft has one
store (in Frisco). Store List, APPLE, https://www.apple.com/retail/storelist/
[https://perma.cc/7AN7-FKLT]; All Locations, MICROSOFT, https://www.micro
soft.com/en-us/store/locations/all-locations [https://perma.cc/G6BR-2DNN].
It remains to be seen if these companies would consider closing these stores or
moving them outside the district to avoid suit in the Eastern District of Texas.
179
With, of course, the caveat that the defendant must be subject to personal
jurisdiction in the particular jurisdiction in which they are sued. See J. McIntyre
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of reincorporating in Delaware would likely have to be substantial for foreign companies to consider moving there—presumably these firms have tax and other reasons (such as home bias)
that caused them to incorporate abroad. Nonetheless, as these
companies have been subject to dozens of costly patent-infringement lawsuits in the Eastern District of Texas in recent
years, the opportunity to incorporate in Delaware could be of
substantial value to them.180
V
THE FUTURE OF PATENT TROLLS AFTER TC HEARTLAND
The exodus of patent cases from Texas to Delaware has
already begun,181 and the Federal Circuit’s recent decisions
after TC Heartland should only accelerate this dramatic
shift.182 We now explain why this transfer is likely to diminish
the impact of patent trolls and lead to more balanced adjudication than in the pre-TC Heartland world.
A. Will Delaware Curb Patent Trolls?
To begin, there are some reasons to be skeptical that the
move to Delaware will rein in patent-troll litigation. After all,
Delaware was the second-most popular forum for patentees
(and patent trolls) before TC Heartland.183 For example, in
2013, about 79.9% of Delaware’s patent lawsuits were brought
by trolls, as compared to about 82.5% in the Eastern District of
Machinery v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 880–82 (2011) (no personal jurisdiction
when defendant did not purposefully avail itself of doing business in the jurisdiction and did not place goods in stream of commerce expecting they would be
purchased in the jurisdiction).
180
Eric Talley has in fact suggested TC Heartland may go as far as reversing
the trend toward corporate inversions, as foreign incorporated firms now can still
be sued in the Eastern District of Texas while U.S. incorporated firms might be
able to avoid the venue. See Eric Talley, SCOTUS Just Invented Unlikely Sentry
Against Corporate Tax Inversions: Patent Trolls, THE CLS BLUE SKY BLOG (May 24,
2017), http://clsbluesky.law.columbia.edu/2017/05/24/the-scotus-just-invented-an-unlikely-sentry-against-corporate-tax-inversions-the-patent-troll/
[https://perma.cc/B6SU-GMQ6]. See also Eric L. Talley, Corporate Inversions
and the Unbundling of Regulatory Competition, 101 VA. L. REV. 1649, 1698–1700
(2015) (discussing the pre-TC Heartland costs of inversion).
181
See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
182
See supra subpart I.D.
183
Cohen et al., supra note 19; see also Lemley, supra note 42, at 405–06
(listing the District of Delaware as having the sixth-highest number of patent
cases litigated between 2000–2010).

R
R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN102.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 53

WILL DELAWARE BE DIFFERENT?

25-JAN-19

8:54

153

Texas.184 Moreover, Delaware did not dismiss non-practicing
entity cases at an exceptionally high rate.185
A deeper look at Delaware, however, reveals a different
story. Despite its popularity as a forum, the state was never
perceived as particularly friendly to patentees and patent trolls;
if anything, the opposite was true.186 Unlike other jurisdictions that promulgated local patent rules as a signal to patentees to file suit there, the District of Delaware never did so.187
In fact, Delaware was a jurisdiction of choice for declaratory
judgment actions—these are suits that potential patent defendants file seeking declaratory relief that their products do not
infringe a patent and that the patent is invalid.188 One would
hardly expect these defendants to pick Delaware if it were especially patentee-friendly.189
Also, the way Delaware managed its cases contributed to
the perception that it was not excessively patentee-friendly. For
example, cases in Delaware generally took longer than the me184
This is based on the cases coded thus far for 2013 (97.2% of all cases). If
we instead look at the random sample, the values are largely the same—80.5% in
E.D. Texas and 76.2% in the District of Delaware. See supra note 155 for more on
the Stanford NPE Litigation dataset.
185
See id. (noting that 8% of NPE suits in the District of Delaware end with a
dismissal or loss, as compared to 4% in the Eastern District of Texas). Of course,
selection bias makes it difficult to compare such statistics, since the cases that
NPEs brought in Delaware might have been of higher quality, and hence less likely
to be dismissed, than the cases they brought in Texas.
186
See, e.g., Letter to Congress from 28 Law Professors & Economists Urging
Caution on the VENUE Act (Aug. 1, 2016), at 2 (noting the proposed VENUE Act
would concentrate infringement actions in the District of Delaware, a venue
“where it is considered much more difficult to enforce patent rights”), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2816062 [https://perma.cc/
72ZC-DAG4].
187
See Anderson, supra note 1, at 655.
188
See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (Declaratory Judgment Act); see also Lemley, supra
note 42, at 410, 413 (noting “accused infringers often choose the District of
Delaware, filing declaratory judgment actions there” but also suggesting this behavior might be “foolish[ ]” because a “higher percentage [of patent cases] make it
to trial in the District of Delaware” and plaintiff win rates are relatively high there).
189
Moreover, it is somewhat difficult to extrapolate from Delaware’s actions in
a pre-TC Heartland world because much of its patent docket previously dealt with
pharmaceutical cases under the Hatch-Waxman Act (formally known as the Drug
Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, P.L. 98-417). Katherine Rhoades, Do Not Pass Go, Do Not Stop for Summary Judgment: The U.S.
District Court for the District of Delaware’s Seemingly Disjunctive Yet Efficient
Procedures in Hatch-Waxman Litigation 14 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 81, 83
(2016). These cases generally go to a bench trial, not a jury trial. Id. at 88. By
contrast, most cases involving patent trolls are destined for a jury (if they are not
dismissed or settle first), see Iancu & Chung, supra note 50, at 301; hence, these
cases have a fundamentally different dynamic. These differences further motivate
the value of our event study, which measures how investors perceive the decision
will affect Delaware firms going forward.
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dian jurisdiction to get to trial; the opposite was true for cases
in the Eastern District of Texas, even as that district’s patent
caseload ramped up over the years.190 Since getting to trial as
quickly as possible generally favors patentees,191 Delaware’s
relatively slow pace made it less attractive to patent trolls than
the Eastern District of Texas.192
Differences in discovery rules also played a crucial role.
For example, a recent study compared the discovery and pretrial deadlines for the two judges with the most patent cases in
their respective districts: Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern
District of Texas and Chief Judge Leonard Stark of the District
of Delaware. The study found that “discovery both begins and
ends earlier in cases litigated before Judge Gilstrap” by about
50 to 100 days.193 And since Eastern District judges are less
likely to extend discovery and pretrial deadlines (and less likely
to grant or quickly decide motions to transfer194), Eastern District defendants are less able to avoid discovery expenses than
their Delaware counterparts, making litigation in Texas predictably more expensive.195 Hence, unlike Delaware, the dynamics of litigation in the Eastern District of Texas helped
patent trolls, since defendants would settle cases early on sim-

190

See Love & Yoon, supra note 39, at 13–15.
See Lemley, supra note 42, at 403 (“[P]atent plaintiffs generally want speed.
Because a patent usually expires after twenty years, it is a wasting asset; every
year waiting to enforce the right in court is a year that a patentee does not have
exclusivity in the market.”); see also id. (noting while delay is less problematic for
patentees seeking only damages, “time spent waiting for a court resolution is time
that cannot be spent using the proceeds of the first suit to sue others. Further,
while plaintiffs wait for a court resolution, defendants can design around the
patentee’s invention, and delay may also bring market changes that render the
patented invention less valuable.”).
192
And as the understaffed Delaware district becomes inundated with new
cases, we can expect this pace to slow even further, thereby further discouraging
troll litigation. See infra note 199 and accompanying text (discussing open seats
in the District of Delaware).
193
See Love & Yoon, supra note 39, at 21–22.
194
Id. at 16.
195
See id. at 21–23.
191
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ply to avoid litigation costs196 they probably could not recover
later on.197
But even putting aside Delaware’s past conduct, there are
compelling reasons to believe Delaware will not be biased toward patent trolls in the future. As we discussed above, more
than any other state, TC Heartland raised the stakes for Delaware, as it now has a lot more to lose if it encourages troll
litigation.198 It would make little sense for Delaware to risk
losing the incorporation fees it depends on by becoming a new
troll haven, particularly since there are likely to be diminishing
marginal returns from attracting even more patent cases to the
state.
Delaware’s disfavor of additional patent litigation is already
being borne out in new cases brought since TC Heartland. The
district currently has only four full-time judges, two of whom
were recently confirmed199—fewer than the five full-time
judges and two senior judges in the Eastern District of
Texas.200 The court has begun citing congestion as a basis for
transferring cases to other courts.201 Contrast this with the

196
Love and Yoon estimate that many Texas defendants settle cases for
around $30,000 to $100,000—values consistent with nuisance litigation. See id.
at 24–25; see also FTC STUDY, supra note 67, at 9–11 (“77% of Litigation PAEs’
settlements fell below a de facto benchmark for the nuisance cost of litigation.
This suggests that discovery costs, and not the technological value of the patent,
may set the benchmark for settlement value in litigation cases.”). But see Spitzer,
supra note 67, at 2–3 (arguing that the FTC Report “incorrectly claims that a low
settlement amount implies that the suit was a [nuisance] suit”).
197
Scholars have explored how loser pays and other reform processes could be
imported into patent litigation to reduce the gains from asserting weak patents,
which are believed by some to be disproportionately used by patent trolls. See,
e.g., Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101
GEO. L.J. 637, 661 (2013) (suggesting enhanced rewards and penalties); see generally Sukhatme, supra note 63, at 166 (investigating how loser pays could be
used to deter weak patents in ex parte patent prosecution).
198
See supra notes 174–75 and accompanying text.
199
Judges’ Info, DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://
www.ded.uscourts.gov/judges-info [https://perma.cc/726A-BNB9]. The two recently confirmed judges both have deep experience in intellectual property law
and have strong connections to the Delaware bar. McParland, supra note 20. The
Chief Judge in the district has also recruited the help of numerous visiting district
judges to help with the rising tide of patent-infringement actions. See id.
200
Eastern District Judges, EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.txed.uscourts.gov/?q=eastern-district-judges [https://perma.cc/
7N7Q-M2MB].
201
Malathi Nayak, Swelling Docket Pushing Delaware Judges to Transfer Patent Cases, INTELL. PROP. ON BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 20, 2017), https://www.bna.com/
swelling-docket-pushing-n57982088314/ [https://perma.cc/EQ8G-74WC].
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Eastern District of Texas, where judges were loath to grant
transfer motions even as their patent caseload soared.202
None of this is to say that additional legislation to rein in
patent trolls is unwarranted. If the optimal level of troll litigation is zero—a point disputed by some scholars203—then TC
Heartland will not accomplish that goal. But a careful look at
the incentives of Delaware courts and the combined knowledge
of investors suggests Delaware will indeed be different from the
Eastern District of Texas in addressing patent-troll litigation.
As such, while TC Heartland will not end troll litigation, the
move to Delaware will strike a decisive blow against such cases.
B. Will Delaware Forum Sell to Corporate Defendants?
So Delaware seems unlikely to become a new version of the
Eastern District of Texas. But should we have the opposite
concern: that Delaware might become too friendly to corporate
patent defendants? In other words, might TC Heartland shift
us into a new era, where patentees with genuine claims of
patent infringement are routinely deterred from filing meritorious suits?
While such an outcome is possible, it seems unlikely for a
few reasons. First, even before TC Heartland, Delaware was a
popular venue for patentees to bring infringement actions.204
These suits were brought in part by a robust and knowledgeable local patent bar.205 If the District of Delaware were to become too defendant-friendly—that is, if their decisions were to
become too skewed in favor of patent defendants—the court
would face a backlash from this well-organized constituency.
The court seems unlikely to steer such an extreme course,
especially since all of its full-time federal judges are connected
202
Even before TC Heartland, the District of Delaware did not exhibit behavior
like other jurisdictions that actively sought to encourage patent litigation. For
example, Delaware never promulgated patent local rules. See Anderson, supra
note 1, at 655.
203
See, e.g., David S. Abrams, Ufuk Akcigit & Gokhan Oz, Patent Trolls: Benign Middleman or Stick-up Artist? 36 (Working Paper, 2017) (finding that NPEs
create value for small firms that do not have resources to defend their patents and
act as middlemen in the patent market, which suffers from informational asymmetry, by “allocat[ing] patents to better users.”). But see Cohen et al., supra note
147, at 3–4 (providing evidence that NPEs are opportunistic in litigation and
measuring real negative impact of NPE litigation on those firms).
204
See Cohen et al., supra note 19.
205
See John E. Kidd & Keeto H. Sabharwal, The District of Delaware: An Ideal
Venue for Patent Litigators, 18 DEL. L. 16, 17 (Win. 2000/2001) (“In some jurisdictions, local counsel is nothing more than a ‘drop box’ for pleadings. Not so in
Delaware. The local practitioners understand the substantive and procedural
aspects of patent law.”).
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to the Delaware bar and are likely in tune with Delaware state
institutions.206
Our belief on this point is also informed by how the District
of Delaware’s sister state court, the Delaware Court of Chancery, has treated corporate litigation in recent years. Similar to
patent-infringement litigation in the Eastern District of Texas,
corporate defendants have faced a flood of shareholder litigation in the Court of Chancery. While the court made efforts to
stem these cases, it did not extinguish them; rather, it opted to
take a more moderate approach that permitted a significant
number of these cases to proceed.207 Delaware’s main attractions in the business-law realm are its expertise and predictable law, which could not develop without a steady flow of
cases. The same is likely true in patent litigation.208 We therefore expect the District of Delaware to follow a similarly measured approach in discouraging nuisance litigation while
promoting productive patent-infringement cases.
Relatedly, some of the same benefits that Delaware provides to patent defendants also accrue to patentees as well.
The District of Delaware’s extensive experience and developed
expertise in patent cases should be appealing to both patentees
and defendants alike. To be sure, expertise was a benefit that
also accrued to defendants who were sued in the Eastern District of Texas. But that court’s other patentee-friendly procedures arguably negated this benefit, tilting the playing field
206
Prior to sitting on the bench, Chief Judge Leonard Stark clerked for Judge
Walter Stapleton on the Third Circuit (seated in Wilmington, Delaware), practiced
law in Wilmington, was an adjunct professor at the University of Delaware, and
was an Assistant U.S. Attorney in Delaware. The Honorable Leonard P. Stark,
DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, UNITED STATES COURTS, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/
judge_24 [https://perma.cc/4ZSF-5HQX]. Judge Gregory Sleet was previously
Deputy Attorney General of Delaware and U.S. Attorney for the District of Delaware. The Honorable Gregory M. Sleet, DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, UNITED STATES
COURTS, http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge_22 [https://perma.cc/UM25KA7B]. Judge Richard G. Andrews was also a former Delaware Assistant U.S.
Attorney as well as a state prosecutor in the Delaware Department of Justice. The
Honorable Richard G. Andrews, DISTRICT OF DELAWARE, UNITED STATES COURTS,
http://www.ded.uscourts.gov/judge_25 [https://perma.cc/QJ2F-SSTV]. The
two judges recently confirmed to the court also have strong connections to the
Delaware bar, particularly its intellectual property community. See McParland,
supra note 20.
207
See Armour, Black & Cheffins, Delaware’s Balancing Act, supra note 94, at
1366.
208
Indeed, the court has had a reputation for expertise in patent law for
decades. See Kidd & Sabharwal, supra note 205, at 16 ( “[T]he Delaware District
Court is one of the nation’s premier trial courts for the resolution of major patent
disputes. Its jurists are among the most knowledgeable and experienced in patent matters. Best of all, they appear to enjoy adjudicating these cases.”).
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against defendants in a way that is unlikely to occur in
Delaware.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while TC Heartland
limits where patentees can file suit, it still permits them to sue
a defendant where its principal place of business is located, or
in any district in which it has a “regular and established place
of business,” if the allegedly infringing goods or services are
sold there (as they most likely will be).209 Most Delaware firms
have, at a minimum, corporate headquarters located in another state. Under the second prong of 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b),
these firms could still be sued in those other jurisdictions.
Hence, if the District of Delaware became excessively friendly to
corporate defendants, patentees could simply take their
chances and sue defendants in these other jurisdictions, even
if judges there do not commonly see patent-infringement cases.
So the District of Delaware will still have some competition for
patent litigation that should deter them from adopting an extreme pro-defendant stance.210
VI
CHOICE OF VENUE BY CORPORATE DEFENDANTS:
TWO-STEP SELECTION
Beyond the context of patent litigation, what might be the
impact of giving defendants more control over venue? While we
do not draw any sweeping conclusions, TC Heartland illustrates a few basic themes that might have broader applicability
outside of patent law.
First, as many scholars have shown, when plaintiffs have a
wide array of possible venues, they have incentives to forum
shop.211 This, in turn, encourages some courts to forum sell:
209

See supra note 27.
Of course, defendants could get around this hurdle by moving their headquarters and business operations to districts that are defendant-friendly. Unlike
reincorporation, however, which is relatively inexpensive and straightforward,
moving a company’s operations is undoubtedly a much more difficult operation
whose costs are likely to outweigh the benefits of diminished patent liability.
211
See, e.g., Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of
Forum-Shopping, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (describing forum selection’s impact on outcome); William H.J. Hubbard, An Empirical Study of the Effect
of Shady Grove v. Allstate on Forum Shopping in the New York Courts, 10 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 151, 171–72 (2013) (showing shifts in vertical forum shopping after
Shady Grove v. Allstate); Paul H. Rubin, Christopher Curran & John F. Curran,
Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers, 107 PUB. CHOICE,
295, 297–98 (2001) (describing interest group forum shopping between legislation
and litigation); Neel U. Sukhatme, A Theoretical and Empirical Study of Forum
Shopping in Diversity Cases 20–21 (Working Paper, 2014) (finding that diversity
jurisdiction creates the potential for forum shopping across federal venues);
210

R

\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\104-1\CRN102.txt

2018]

unknown

Seq: 59

WILL DELAWARE BE DIFFERENT?

25-JAN-19

8:54

159

to adopt local procedures or administrative rules that are substantively or procedurally biased in favor of plaintiffs to incentivize them to file suit there.212 To be sure, many courts will
have no inclination to forum sell—this might include, for example, larger jurisdictions that are already prominent litigation
venues with crowded dockets.213 But it sometimes takes only a
few or even just one venue engaging in forum selling to impact
where cases are filed, as the Eastern District of Texas demonstrated.214 And to the extent we believe forum selling is socially
suboptimal, then a system in which plaintiffs are given carte
blanche over where to file suit is problematic.
By contrast, if defendants have some control over where a
lawsuit against them is filed—as many potential patent defendants will have post-TC Heartland—there are two potentially
balancing factors at play. On the one hand, many courts still
have incentives to adopt policies that encourage plaintiffs to file
suit there, since such suits generate benefits for the local bar
and the local economy.215 These incentives are also likely to be
strongest in smaller jurisdictions, perhaps outside of major
urban centers, for which the influx of cases is likely to have a
greater economic impact or generate more prestige. The Eastern District of Texas is a prime example of such a jurisdiction.
On the other hand, a state now has incentives to encourage
defendants to choose its forum, since no lawsuits will occur in
its courts unless defendants take whatever affirmative action
(e.g., filing articles of incorporation or setting up a principal
place of business or “regular and established place of business”) is required before a plaintiff can sue them there.
Michelle J. White, Asbestos Litigation: Procedural Innovations and Forum Shopping, 35 J. LEG. STUD. 365, 395–97 (2006) (describing forum shopping in asbestos
cases).
212
See, e.g., LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005); Anderson, supra note
1, at 661–66 (discussing judicial incentives to compete); Klerman & Reilly, supra
note 1, at 250–70 (arguing judges in the Eastern District of Texas have departed
from mainstream procedure to attract patent cases); Daniel Klerman, Personal
Jurisdiction and Product Liability, 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 1551, 1554 (2012) (positing
potential forum selling in the product liability context); Daniel Klerman, Rethinking Personal Jurisdiction, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 245, 259–63 (2014) (describing how
plaintiff choice of forum can lead to a pro-plaintiff bias).
213
See Klerman & Reilly, supra note 1, at 300 (noting a common characteristic
of many, but not all, venues that forum sell include an absence of major cities or
industries).
214
See id. at 243, 271 (referencing the Eastern District of Texas and noting
“[w]hile only a few judges may be motivated to attract more cases, their actions
can have large effects because their courts will attract a disproportionate share of
cases.”).
215
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text.
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Accordingly, such forums have incentives not to become
too biased in favor of either plaintiffs or defendants. If a forum
became too plaintiff-friendly, then it would risk losing firms
that are incorporated in that state—a consideration that would
weigh heavily on a state like Delaware, as we discussed previously. Other states may care less about incorporations but
more about encouraging firms to keep or maintain physical
business operations in their state. Such operations may be
important economic drivers for the state; one might expect this
effect to be greatest for large companies that operate in small,
non-urban jurisdictions.216
Conversely, becoming too defendant-friendly is unlikely to
pay off for a court, since plaintiffs often retain some choice over
venue, as is true in patent cases post-TC Heartland. In particular, since many firms will incorporate in one state but maintain
their principal place of business in another, plaintiffs will often
have at least two possible forums in which they can sue. If one
forum becomes excessively defendant-friendly, plaintiffs can
still file suit in the other forum. Put differently, the presence of
at least one other competing venue tempers courts’ incentives
to forum sell too heavily to defendants.
Importantly, a putative defendant will likely pick this alternate venue for reasons that have little to do with potential
liability concerns. Rather, where a firm situates its principal
place of business or its physical facilities will depend primarily
on business factors such as location of customers, location of
materials, labor, and other manufacturing inputs, and home
bias.
We can thus see that post-TC Heartland, venue selection in
patent cases is now a two-step process, with both plaintiffs and
defendants having input. First, defendants pick where they are
willing to be sued, based on where they decide to incorporate
and build their physical facilities. Second, patentees select,
from among these forums, the one that gives them the highest
expected return. If a forum is excessively patentee-friendly,
defendants might avoid incorporating in that jurisdiction or
situating their business there, though such a decision might be
costly to the firm. If a forum is excessively defendant-friendly,
then plaintiffs can avoid that forum by filing suit in the one or
216
For example, one might expect Apple to close its two stores in the Eastern
District of Texas (currently in two northern Dallas suburbs) to avoid subjecting
itself to venue in infringement actions there. This is especially true since they
could simply relocate the stores to Dallas itself or to other nearby suburbs, all of
which are in the Northern District of Texas. See supra note 178.
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more other forums likely available to them. While there is no
guarantee this mechanism is optimal or removes all forumspecific bias, giving both defendants and plaintiffs some control over venue should mitigate concerns about forum selling to
either party.
This kind of two-step forum-selection process might also
exist outside of patent law. Several recent Supreme Court decisions—Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,217
Daimler AG v. Bauman,218 BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,219 and
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California, San
Francisco County220—emphasized that state courts typically
cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant corporation if the underlying claims have little or no connection to the
forum state, and if the defendant corporation is both incorporated outside the forum state and has its principal place of
business elsewhere. Unlike TC Heartland, these cases are
moored in the constitutional mandates of due process. But
nonetheless, each case increases the chances that a corporation will be sued in its state of incorporation or its home state
as compared to a “random” venue, such as the Eastern District
of Texas in the patent context. As such, these cases give defendants more control over where suits against them can be
filed.221
So if shared control over venue mitigates a court’s incentives to forum sell by slanting its procedural or substantive law
217
564 U.S. 915, 918–20 (2011) (foreign subsidiary of Ohio parent corporation
not subject to general personal jurisdiction in North Carolina state court).
218
571 U.S. 117, 138–39 (2014) (foreign national cannot sue foreign parent
corporation in California using general personal jurisdiction despite U.S. subsidiary’s forum contacts).
219
137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (defendant corporation subject to general
personal jurisdiction outside of state of incorporation or principal place of business only in “exceptional case” (quoting Daimler AG, 571 U.S. at 139 n.19)).
220
137 S. Ct. 1773, 1781 (2017) (non-California residents cannot sue nonCalifornia corporation in California that does not have principal place of business
there).
221
Arguably, these cases give defendants less control over venue selection
than TC Heartland. First, unlike the patent troll context, in which many firms
clearly anticipate they will be patent defendants more often than patent plaintiffs,
the issue may be less clear in other forms of litigation. Second, in many tort suits,
venue may exist in locales that the defendant arguably did not “choose.” For
example, consider an Illinois plaintiff who is injured in a car accident with a
company’s truck while driving in Indiana; the company is headquartered in New
Jersey and incorporated in Delaware. In addition to potentially filing suit in
Delaware or New Jersey, the plaintiff could also sue the defendant in Indiana
(under specific personal jurisdiction), even if the company does not have any
physical offices in that state. Moreover, complete diversity also exists between the
parties, so if the amount in controversy between the parties exceeds $75,000, the
plaintiff could also file suit in federal court.
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to favor one side, how else might that court entice litigants?
Rather than focusing on rules that favor defendants or plaintiffs, states might instead develop substantive expertise and
predictable case law that benefits both sides. Put differently,
knowledgeable judges and stable, coherent case law arguably
inure to the benefit of both plaintiffs and defendants. Instead
of forum selling to one party or another, when defendants have
some control over where suits might be filed, courts have an
incentive to take a balanced approach to litigation, where they
compete for new cases based on judicial expertise and unbiased, high quality case law. As we discussed above, this is
arguably the path that Delaware took in corporate and bankruptcy matters, and this is the path we expect the District of
Delaware to take when deciding patent cases post-TC
Heartland.
CONCLUSION
After TC Heartland, patent-infringement litigation is shifting en masse from Texas to Delaware. As we have shown,
investors—particularly those invested in Delaware firms—are
optimistic that indeed, Delaware will be different. The rise of
patent trolls, and the resulting economic costs, have concerned
scholars and policymakers of varied political stripes. Despite
some commentary to the contrary, we believe TC Heartland will
stem the tide of troll litigation, making such lawsuits less common and less profitable.
But more importantly, we believe TC Heartland will change
court behavior and corporate practice in ways not widely recognized. By making a company’s state of incorporation the linchpin for determining venue in many patent infringement suits,
TC Heartland gives defendants more control over where they
can be sued. The decision may counterbalance certain courts’
tendency to adopt plaintiff-friendly procedural rules, and it arguably promotes a more balanced system in which neither
plaintiff nor defendant interests are privileged. In particular,
we expect Delaware to compete for litigation by enhancing its
judicial expertise and issuing predictable case law, similar to
how it acquired a leading status in corporate litigation and
bankruptcy proceedings.
If choice of venue by defendants helps curb excessive litigation in the patent context, this advantage may also translate to
other fields of law. Thus, TC Heartland’s greatest long-term
legacy could extend far beyond the parochial boundaries of
patent litigation.
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APPENDIX
Variable Descriptions
Description
A dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is incorporated in the US, and (1) it is not incorporated
in Texas, (2) its headquarters are not located in
the Eastern District of Texas, and (3) it does not
have a store in the Eastern District of Texas.
Affected DE
A dummy variable equal to 1 if Affected equals
1 and the firm is incorporated in Delaware.
Affected NO DE A dummy variable equal to 1 if Affected equals
1 and the firm is not incorporated in Delaware.
Assets
Total firm assets in $ millions as of the end of
the previous fiscal year.
Book/Market
Ratio of firm book-value of equity to market
value as of the end of the previous fiscal year.
(Book value of equity is the sum of stockholders
equity (SEQ), Deferred Tax (TXDB), and Investment Tax Credit (ITCB), minus Preferred Stock
(PREF). Depending on data availability, we use
redemption (item PSTKRV), liquidation (item
PSTKL), or par value (item PSTK) to represent
the book value of preferred stock.
Cash Level
The firm’s level of cash in $ millions at the end
of the previous fiscal year.
Cash Shock
A dummy variable that equals 1 if a change in
cash in the past fiscal year is among the top 5%
of cash changes in its industry based on two
digit SIC codes.
Lawsuit
Predicted probability that a firm is sued for paProbability
tent infringement in a given year based on the
regression estimates reported in column 1 of
Table 3.
Lawsuits by
The number of patent-infringement lawsuits in
Trolls
any given year by a patent-assertion entity.
Market Value
Market value in $ millions as of the end of the
previous fiscal year.
Missing R&D
A dummy variable equal to 1 if data on R&D
expense in a given fiscal year is missing.
Missing Patents A dummy variable equal to 1 if a data on Patents in a given fiscal year is missing.
Non-Troll
Predicted probability that a firm is sued for paProbability
tent infringement in a given year, where the
plaintiff is not a patent-assertion entity, based
on the regression estimates reported in column
3 of Table 3.
Past Returns
Stock market return to equity corresponding to
the fiscal year.
Patents
Number of patents issued to the firm in the
past five years.
Patent Lawsuits The number of patent infringement lawsuits in
any given year by any plaintiff.
Variable
Affected

Source
Compustat,
hand-coding

Compustat
Compustat

Compustat
Compustat

Stanford
NPE Dataset
Compustat

Compustat
Kogan et al.
(2017)
Stanford
NPE Dataset
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Variable Descriptions
Variable
Description
Source
Troll Probability Predicted probability that a firm is sued for patent infringement in a given year, where the
plaintiff is a patent assertion entity, based on
the regression estimates reported in column 2
of Table 3.
R&D Expense
R&D expenditures in $ millions as of the end of Compustat
the previous fiscal year.

